

# Legislative –Executive Relations and Public Policy Formulation and Implementation in Lagos State, Nigeria

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**Abstract:** The necessity of building a workable synergy and desirable relationship between the forces of government both at the levels of executive and legislative systems towards improved efficiency in her policy models lies at the heart of this study. The nature of legislature-executive relations over the years attracted a wide variety of viewpoints both about conflict and cooperation relationship. The main objective of the study is to determine the effect of legislative and executive relations on policy formulation and implementation with particular reference to Lagos State, Nigeria. The study used both quantitative and qualitative methodologies. The quantitative method used a structured questionnaire designed by the researcher. The qualitative method used in-depth interview, Focused Group Discussions (FGDs) and direct observation. The population of the study consisted of members of the State Assembly, State Executive Council, Permanent Secretaries, Directors, Deputy Directors and other Senior Civil Officials in both legislative and executive arms of the State. The study adopts cross-sectional survey research design. It utilizes purposive sampling selected the sample of eighty (80) respondents drawn from the legislative and executive arms of Lagos state as participants in the study. Secondary data was sourced from relevant textbooks, academic journals, newspapers clippings as well as official documents and publications such as Gazettes and manuals from State House of Assembly, Governor's office and relevant Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs). The Cronbach Alpha reliability for construct is 0.82. The data obtained were presented and analyzed using descriptive statistics while the stated hypotheses were tested using inferential statistics like the correlation and regression statistical methods. The findings indicated that cooperative legislative-executive relations engender improved performance in public policy formulation and implementation in Lagos state. It was discovered that the politic suffers from excessive interference and influence from the political class when the budget and appointments are concerned. The study, therefore, recommended among others by pointing out the importance of separation of powers in restraining the branches to ensure effectiveness in policy making and implementation as well as safeguarding budget process and enhancing accountability in public budgeting. It recommends that both arms of government should embark on regular capacity building on basic conflict resolution and management training to improving their conflict management skills as well as their problem-solving skills.

**Keywords:** Budgetary Process, Conflict, Legislative – Executive Relations, Policy Implementation and Policy Making.

## Introduction

Nigeria has had eighteen (18) years of unbroken democratic stability since May 29, 1999, to date, after a prolonged military usurpation of the country's political machinery. However, the Nigeria's Fourth Republic has witnessed a conflictual relationship between the executive and legislature, both at the federal and state levels. Often, the conflict between the executive and legislature heats up the polity to the extent that the machinery of the state is plunged into a state of inactivity. However, the relationship that exists between the legislature and executive branches of government is very crucial for attaining the formulation and implementation of effective policies (Momodu & Matuidi, 2013).

With the return to civil rule in 1999, the relationship between the executive and the legislature has been conflictual rather than harmonious. This is evident in the frequent change of leadership in the two chambers of National Assembly, especially the Senate, as experience under Obasanjo administration. However, since 2007, the executive-

legislative relations had significantly improved. There is stability in the leaderships of the two chambers of the National Assembly, while threats of impeachment have fizzled out. Though there is conflict in National Assembly, it appears the two arms have rediscovered their complementary roles in governance (Anazodo, 2015).

The necessity of building a desirable relationship between the forces of government both at the levels of executive and legislative systems towards improved efficiency in her policy models lies at the heart of this study. However, it is worth noting that the Nigerian political system since her independence in 1960 has grossly known no peace. This is as a result of the high level of feud orchestrated by political figures in the country thereby either overheating the already tensed system or at best, running the Nigerian entity more or less like a private estate (Oyediran, 2003). More than fifty years after Nigeria gained political independence the country is faced with the problem efficiency in her policy model.

The study of legislative-executive relations is primarily interested in the balance of power between the parliament and the government, and how the former can control or influence the actions of the executive (Martin, Saalfeld, & Strøm, 2014). However, the relationship between these two arms of government either harmonious or conflictual. This often foster or disrupts the proper formulation and implementation of public policies, which are the aggregate product of decisions and which often, aimed at executing plans to refocus the direction of the generality of a particular society or nation. However, in Nigeria, public policies most often, are either meant to fail from the beginning or failed midway for so many reasons. This study, therefore, examines the nature of legislative-executive relations and policy formulation and implementation in Lagos State, Nigeria.

### **Statement of the Problem**

Over the years, the nature of legislature-executive relations in the presidential system, however, has over the years, attracted a wide variety of viewpoints both about conflict and cooperation, whether one or the other dominates, and whether benefits or liabilities result from either. While some see legislature-executive conflict as a necessary and beneficial precondition to limiting and controlling government (Madison, 1992), others view it as contributing to gridlock over major public policy decisions, thus making government ineffective (Kopecky, 2004).

The constant feud between the two critical organs of government usually affects the effectiveness of the government in its bid to deliver the dividends of democracy to the electorate. Besides, the constant conflict between the executive and legislature could put the nation's democracy in danger, if not properly tackled. The relationship between the legislature and the executive in Nigeria is characterized by mutual suspicion, acrimony and political rivalry (Aiyede, 2005; Nwannekanma & Ogbodo, 2010). Also, the President is empowered to make various appointments; the 1999 Constitution requires the Senate to confirm most of these appointments. Similarly, at the State level, various appointments made by State Governors must first and foremost be approved by the House of Assembly before they can become effective. Some of these appointments include Commissioners, Chairmen, and members of statutory Commissions, Judges, etc. During the process of scrutinizing the nominees, various factors do come into play which eventually leads to the ratification of their appointment as the legislature and executive often tries to ensure that someone within his cabal is favored. Like a lot of favoritism, bias and nepotism are being observed during the process both on the part of the executive and legislature (Ukase, 2003). This study fills these gaps in the literature by examining legislature-executive relations from a holistic perspective and situating the study within the framework of the formal designs as well as the role of the informal practices insinuated primarily by Nigeria's environment.

### **Objectives of the Study**

The main objective of the study is to determine the effect of legislative and executive relations on policy formulation and implementation. Other objectives include:

1. To examine the implications of harmonious/conflictual legislative-executive relations on the budgetary process in Lagos state.
2. To determine the extent to which legislative-executive conflict affect public policy making and implementation in Lagos state.

### **Research Questions**

The study would seek to provide answers to the following questions:

1. What are the implications of harmonious/conflictual legislative-executive relations on the budgetary process in Lagos State?
2. Can legislature-executive conflict affect public policy making and implementation in Lagos State?

## Research Hypotheses

1. Harmonious/conflictual legislative-executive relations have no significant implications on the budgetary process in Lagos State.
2. Legislative-executive conflict does not influence effective public policy making and implementation in Lagos state.

## Literature Review

### Conceptual Framework

#### Legislative-Executive Relations

The term "legislature" has been given different names across nations of the world. It is referred to as Parliament in Britain, Congress in the United States, National Assembly (the central legislature) in Nigeria, etc. (Lafenwa, 2009). Legislature occupies a crucial position in the machinery of government. It is the branch of government with the singular purpose of articulating and expressing the collective will of the people (Bernick & Bernick, 2008). Okoosi-Simbine (2010) conceptualizes the legislature as the law-making, deliberative and policy influencing body working for the furtherance of a democratic political system.

The executive, according to Heywood (2007), is the irreducible core of government. Similarly, Laski (1992) sees the executive as occupying a very crucial position in the administration of a state. Executive in a democratic system exists to decide on the final choice of policy to be submitted to the Parliament for approval; it ensures that the public services fully adhere to the policy as intended by the Parliament; and ensures that it delimits and also coordinates the activities of the different departments of state. Anifowose (2008), sees the executive as the branch of government responsible for applying the authoritative rules and policies of society. Though the term executive is understood both in broad and narrow senses, in the realm of the study of politics, its narrow meaning is applied. It is the executive head, and his principal colleagues who run the machinery of government formulate national policy and see that it is properly implemented (Abonyi, 2006).

The foregoing analysis reveals that the executive initiates policies and programs, executes them after they are passed into law by the assembly, and equally coordinates government policies to ensure that policy execution is done within the framework of the original plan and the legislature's approved policy. It is because of these enormous responsibilities that Fasagba (2010) sees the executive as strategically important to the attainment of democratic goods. Since the executive implements the laws made by the legislature, it is necessary that it should comprise competent and efficient people.

The relationship between executives and legislatures is crucial to scholarship on comparative politics. This classification has thoroughly dominated scholars' understanding of executive-legislative relations that it has almost no conceptual competition (Cheihub, 2007). Aiyede & Isumonah (2002) stated the importance of peaceful coexistence between the executive and the legislature could only occur in a context in which political institutions are functional and interact in a way that reinforces confidence in the government and the process through which the offices of these government institutions are filled. In a similar dimension, Kopecky (2004) sees the relationship between the legislature and the executive as one of the key defining features of the functioning of any political system. He noted the vital place that structural and legal factors hold in shaping the relationships between these two political institutions. This position is emphasized by Lijphart (2004) when he argued that the constitutional prerogatives vested in legislatures and the executive are most important because they define the broad framework for interactions between the two powers.

#### Public Policy Making and Implementation

Many definitions of public policy abound, and it may simply be futile trying to discover which is correct or proper. Owen (1994) agrees with the fact that there is no an all-inclusive definition of public policy by saying that it is not possible to define public policy in any precise way. He went further to say that definitions of public policy found in the literature range from the declaration of intent, a program of goals and general rules covering future behavior to government decisions, a selected line or course of action or inaction and even all government action. However, one of the commonly quoted but simple definitions of public policy is that given by Dye (1995), where he defines public policy as whatever government chooses to do or not to do.

Public policy is a purposive course of action followed by an actor or set of actors in dealing with a problem or matter of concern. It is a series of goal-oriented actions taken by government actors. It connotes official statements determining the plan of action or what the government wants to do. Whatever the form it takes, however, public

policy is what public administrators execute (Fidelis & Kimiebi, 2011). Public policy can be seen as a set of interrelated decisions by political actors concerning the selection of goals and the means of achieving them within a specified situation. (Jenkins in Sharma, Sadana & Kaur, 2012).

### **An Overview of Legislative –Executive Relations**

Research on the relationship between the executive and the legislature in recent times has been bifurcated along these forms of political structure – Presidentialism and Parliamentarism to determining the extent to which these political arrangements matter in legislature-executive relations (Hammond & Butler, 2003). This is going by the fact that the major institutional characteristic which distinguishes the two systems of government is the degree of separateness of origin and survival between the executive and the legislature (Cheibub, 2007). Therefore, an examination is taken into the nature of legislative-executive relations in Nigeria which operates a presidential system.

There are some basic principles of the presidential form of government which has implications for legislature-executive relations. Firstly, the President who is the Chief Executive is elected in a popular election through popularly elected presidential electoral college. In the latter, the President has his or her electoral base (Beermann, 2011). Secondly, the President holds office for a constitutionally fixed term (Cheibub, 2007). Thirdly, there exists a constitutionally guaranteed executive authority to execute the laws which imply that one branch (legislature) makes the laws, the other (executive) implements them (Samuels & Eaton, 2002; Nijzink, Mozaffar & Azevedo, 2006). Fourthly, the Chief executive has control over the cabinet as a result of his power to select his ministers without restriction and are (the ministers) responsible to him and not to the legislature (Idahosa & Ekperekude, 1995; Cheibub, 2007). These basic features are the salient premises on which presidential system rests and have been followed in all presidential systems. In the presidential system therefore, Beermann, (2011) observes that autonomy takes a different form than in systems in which the executive is selected by the legislature and stays in power only as long as it has the continued confidence of the legislature.

Political parties in presidential systems are sometimes less structured, and legislators may be free to identify with their constituency interests, or other regional, ethnic, economic interests rather than their parties when considering policy issues (Hammond & Butler, 2003). This is particularly so due to the fact that the failure of the legislators to vote with their parties do not threaten to bring down the government (Samuels, 2002). The president and the majority of the legislature may belong to different parties or may have divergent preferences even if they belong to the same party; hence members are less amenable to voting along party line (Marsteintredet, 2008). Also, diffused character of leadership within the legislature brought about by separation of powers affects party discipline within the legislature (Abonyi, 2006). In the same vein, there is a possible case of minority than majority government in Presidentialism. Minority governments are those in which the governing coalition does not control a majority of seats in the legislature or, in a bicameral system, those in which it does not control a majority of seats in at least one of the chambers (Cheibub, 2002). In minority governments, a presidential system would cause deadlocks because of inability to form majority coalitions. If however, coalition were to occur, lack of party discipline that is inherent in presidential will make it unstable (Marsteintredet, 2008).

The relationship between the executive and the legislature in a presidential system is certainly one of the most intriguing empirical questions in the study of political institutions. The concomitant effects of the institutional arrangements of the presidential system often pose the crucial problem of the relationship between the executive and the legislature which is being pejoratively referred to as "deadlock," "gridlock" or "stalemate" (Hammond, & Butler, 2003).

### **Legislative-Executive Relations and Budgeting Process in Nigeria**

The 1999 constitution established the legal framework for democratic government based on a presidential system. Under the constitution, Nigeria is also structured as a 'Federation.' Thus, it established a bicameral legislature at the federal level while at the state level, it established a unicameral legislature. Since the re-emergence of democracy on May 29, 1999, the country has witnessed conflicts between the legislators and the executive over the budgetary processes at all levels of government (Izedonimu, 1997).

The role of the legislature and the executive in public finance remains a controversial topic. First, public choice theorists tend to portray the legislators as selfish politicians, who will like to help themselves with public resources either to pursue their individual, constituency and political party interests and not national interest. On the other hand, the parliamentarians argue that the executive, largely made up of non-elected members cannot claim to

understand the needs of the people better. This is predicated on the assumption that the parliament is large, made up of elected representatives, who logically understand the needs of the people (Mbah, 2007).

Premchand (1983) opined that government budget in the early stages of its evolution was concerned with serving the purpose of legislative accountability. This emanated from the long struggle between the legislature and the monarchs, culminating to the legislative control of taxation, allocation of expenditure and borrowing by governments. Government budgets have some important characteristics which are associated with regularity - requiring the annual submission of budgets, unity - meaning comprehensiveness of all the transactions of government; accuracy - implying that revenue and expenditures are firm as a bond with the legislature and a basis of their approval; clarity - so that the community and its representatives could understand and deliberate on its contents, and publicity, therefore, implying that it is a public document and the content is known by the community. Therefore, the purpose of a government budget may be considered as a tool of fiscal accountability, management, and economic policy.

### **Legislative-Executive Relations Conflict and Public Policy Making and Implementation**

The increased risk of executive-legislative conflict is one of the dangers of presidentialism. This according to Lijphart (1984) is the inevitable result of the co-existence of the two independent organs that presidential government creates and that may be in disagreement. Unlike in parliamentary systems, there are no institutional means of resolving a confrontation between the executive and the legislative branches of government. In some cases, the president may resort to formal or informal powers to overcome the institutional paralysis. The problem of executive-legislative conflict as observed by Linz (1990) is aggravated by the temporal rigidity of presidential systems. The fixed term in office of the president and the fixed duration of the legislative period do not leave room for the readjustments that political events may require.

The legislature and executive are two very important political institutions in presidential democratic regimes, and they have a very critical task to play in promoting good governance. The achievement of this task, however, is dependent on whether the relationship that exists between these institutions is constructive or conflictive (Momodu & Matudi, 2013). The relationship between the executive and legislature in Nigeria's fourth republic has been characterized more by dysfunctional conflicts which often deadlocks the policy making and implementation process, ultimately inhibiting good governance. The constant feud between the two critical organs of government usually affects the effectiveness of the government in its bid to deliver the dividends of democracy to the electorate. As observed by Nwokeoma (2011) that the ability of any democratic government to deliver the concrete benefits of good governance to the citizens is determined by the smooth functioning of the executive, judiciary and legislative arms of government. He, therefore, argued that this assumption reinforces the theory of separation of the powers of the different arms of government to prevent arbitrariness, tyranny, and recklessness. This is supported by Omotola (2008) that it is difficult to talk of democracy where constitutionalism is not properly rooted and institutionalized. Also Ajayi (2007) and Nwosu (1998) have pointed out the effects of executive-legislative conflicts on previous Republics in Nigeria. They noted accordingly, that the "previous republics collapsed largely not because the constitutions were bad; rather, the demise of these republics resulted from the inability of the governing elites to comply with the basic rules of the game."

Since the return to democracy on May 29, 1999, in Nigeria, the country has witnessed conflicts between the legislature and the executive on some issues. The operation of the Constitution was characterized by conflicts, confrontations, feuds and deadlocks between the executive and legislative arms of government especially at the federal level, that usually centered on the question of the existence, scope, and efficacy of the legislature's independence and oversight function in the constitutional scheme (Oyewo, 2007). Also, budgetary processes at all levels of government cause a serious conflict between governmental institutions. As argued by Obasanjo (2000) thus: it was perhaps expected that at the beginning of our search for the meaning and the form of a true republican democracy, mistakes would be made, and extreme positions will be taken by those involved in the search'. It is important to note that at the center of this conflict is the timing of budget presentation and its eventual passage as well as assent and implementation (Izedonimi, 1997). Apart from the budgetary process, some other feud that arises in Executive-Legislative relations are in the appointment/ratification of Ministers, Ambassadors, High Commissioners and Commission Chairmen /Members, ratification of treaties, the election of Principal Officers of the legislature, impeachment, recall amongst others.

Since the commencement of the Fourth Republic, there has been the growing culture of impunity and flagrant disregard to the rule of law noticeable among members of the executives and parliaments both at the national and state levels in Nigeria. This has consequently heightened confrontations between these institutions, to such an extent

that the quest for good governance in the country has been affected negatively (Momodu & Matudi, 2013). The protracted face-off took a life of notoriety under the Obasanjo administration, with the removal of three Senate Presidents in three years. In the circumstances that led to the removal of Senators Evan(s) Enwerem, Chuba Okadigbo or Adolphus Wabara, as senate presidents, the connivance, collusion or involvement of the executive arm of government was always alleged (Momodu & Matudi, 2013; Eme, & Ogbochie, 2014). Obasanjo administration was characterized by gridlocks over major public policy decisions and struggles in a climate of partisanship because of the face-off between the executive and the legislature (Aiyede 2005). Also, two Speakers of House of Representatives, Salisu Buhari and Patricia Etteh were impeached in 2000 and 2007 respectively. At the state level, Fatile and Adejuwon (2016) observed that some state governors were victims of legislative-executive conflicts because they were impeached before the expiration of their tenure. These according to them include Gov. Ayo Fayose of Ekiti State who was impeached on the 16th October 2006; Peter Obi of Anambra State on the 2nd November 2006; Joshua Dariye, of Plateau State, on the 13th of November 2006; Rashidi Adewolu Ladoja, of Oyo State, on the 12th of January 2006; Diepreye Alamieyeseigha of Bayelsa State on the 9th of December 2005 and Murtala Nyako of Adamawa State, in July 2014.

The Nigerian experience has shown a worrisome gap between the legislature and the executive. This has given rise to serious social, economic and political disconnect that arise from the practice of democracy as Nigeria is experiencing in the fourth republic. For instance, the conflict between the legislature and the executive has affected the passing of appropriation bills under Obasanjo and Jonathan administration. In this present Buhari administration, legislative-executive relations has been conflictual rather than harmonious; this is evident in the passing of 2016 appropriation bill and the confirmation of political appointee by the executive in 2017.

### **Empirical Review**

In the study carried out by Santiso & Belgrano, (2004), they noted that in most emerging democracies, there had been increased legislative activism in public budgeting and this has been affecting executive-legislative relations. This, therefore, remains one of the greatest challenges to strengthen democratic accountability in ensuring fiscal discipline. They believed that the contribution of the legislature to budget oversight remains inhibited by structural factors, both internal and external to the legislative organization. The governance of the budget reflects a delicate balance between executive power and legislative oversight whose effectiveness is largely determined by the broader governance context of budget policy-making (Santiso & Belgrano 2004).

Similarly, Williams, (2012) argued that legislative oversight function is one of the cornerstones of democracy. He believes that affective monitoring of the executive by the legislature is an indicator of good governance. Because, it is through oversight that the legislature can ensure a balance of power and assert its role as the defender of people's interests. While Stair-Hall, (2012) believed that legislative oversight is the specific focus of some parliament activities and it is one of the major parts of the legislative process that is often difficult to separate from the lawmaking process. To Hubbard, (2012) legislative oversight remains more an idea than a reality. He concluded that if legislative oversight is to be truly effective, legislative best practices must be identified and implemented. Also, Warren & Joachim, (2004) argued that legislature's 'power of the purse' is a fundamental feature of democracy. The vast majority of democratic constitutions require appropriations and taxation measures to be approved by the legislature to become effective, therefore, the legislature must ensure that the revenue and spending measures it authorizes are fiscally sound, match the needs of the population with available resources, and are implemented properly and efficiently. They further asserted that the executive will always have a greater information base than the parliament, and the legislature will enter the process at a later stage (Warren & Joachim 2004). In his own study, Langdon, (2012) observed that one major problem which legislature face is how their increased influence can contribute to governance improvements and overwhelming policy priority of countering poverty. He noted that the challenges of legislatures to accelerate poverty reduction through financial oversight, who would seriously question such a possibility and it is common to hear major objections to a significant parliamentary role in economic policy making (Langdon, 2012).

### **Theoretical Framework**

Theory is an essential ingredient in any research work, as it provides a foundational structure upon which a research work anchors. As posited by Bunch, (2005), a theory gives a framework for evaluating various strategies in both the long and short run, and for seeing the types of changes that they are likely to produce. This paper adopts the eclectic approach. It anchored on Institutional and System theories.

### **Institutional Approach**

The institutional approach has been a fundamental theoretical framework to the study of legislature-executive relations (Lijphart, 2004). This approach assumes that conflict and cooperation between the executive and the legislature are conditioned by fundamental questions of institutional design. According to this theory, features of a country's institutional framework account for observed political, economic and social outcomes in the country (Hammond & Butler, 2003). Institutions do not merely shape the strategies of actors, they also affect the probability distribution of certain political outcomes, and thus, a country's political structure, therefore, has great implications on policy outcomes (Cheibub 2007). While admitting the importance of institutional design as a predictor of legislature-executive relations, it is imperative to note that other informal or Para-constitutional behavioral factors equally shape the nature of legislature-executive relations observable in a political system. As argue by Hammond & Butler (2003) although institutional designs affect government capabilities, several other non-institutional factors sometimes mediate the impact of institutions. A more encompassing theory that will treat a larger number of relations and produce a more complex analysis is therefore desired.

The institutional view of executive-legislature hold strong as a factor that shapes the relationship between the executive and the legislature, numerous informal rules, and conventions, such as the customs concerning the nomination of members to the cabinet following an election, are very important as well. Perhaps this is exemplified by Bernick & Bernick (2008) when they affirmed that such relationships are largely shaped by the attitudes and beliefs of the participants. They contend that these relationships are complex, depending on a range of formal and informal practices.

### **Systems Theory**

This study utilizes the system theory associated with David Easton as the general framework for the analysis of the roles of the Legislature and executive. The theory is derived from the behavioral models of public policy decision-making. David Easton defined a political system as a system of interaction in any society through which binding or authoritative decisions are made and implemented; he considered the political system as existing within an environment of another system; physical, biological, social, psychological, etc. (Enenumo, 2008). Analytically, a political system is distinct from other social system by the system boundaries which may not necessarily be observable geographical boundaries but which are identified by the pattern of interaction and activities (Fatile, 2012). The theory seeks to explain not only how policy decisions are made but also how changes and innovations in public policies result from perceptions of the larger community, and of the legislature.

The system approach applies to the study because the legislative-executive relation is a system of transaction among managers of the hierarchically structured level of government within a state. It ensures a platform of bargaining negotiation and consensus on the common issues of politics (Ajulor & Okewale, 2011). In the case of Nigeria, it allows the legislature to interact with the executive and judiciary to continue to function efficiently and effectively. An integral part of this is the proper orientation of the various arms of government, so that they understand how they all fit together as a whole so they can easily facilitate the governmental process rather than become stumbling blocks in the policy formulation and implementation process.

### **Methodology**

The study used both quantitative and qualitative methodologies. The quantitative method used a structured questionnaire designed by the researcher. The qualitative method used in-depth interview, Focused Group Discussions (FGDs) and direct observation. The study population consisted of members of the State Assembly, State Executive Council, Permanent Secretaries, Directors, Deputy Directors and other Senior Civil Officials in both legislative and executive arms of the State. Using cross-sectional survey research design, a sample of eighty (80) respondents drawn from the legislative and executive arms of Lagos state were selected by purposive sampling as participants in the study. Secondary data were sourced from relevant textbooks, academic journals, newspapers clippings as well as official documents and publications such as Gazettes and manuals from State House of Assembly, Governor's office and relevant Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs).

To ensure the validation of the instrument, content validity method was used. The draft questionnaire and interview guide were given to research specialists and experts who made amendment and corrections where necessary to research work. The essence of validity of research work was to ascertain the degree to which legislative-executive relations affect public policy formulation and implementation in Lagos state. To ensure the reliability of the instrument, a pilot study was conducted by the researcher vis-à-vis the expected outcome based on the hypotheses. The Cronbach Alpha reliability for construct is 0.82. The data obtained were presented and analyzed using

descriptive statistics while the stated hypotheses were tested using inferential statistics like the correlation and regression statistical methods.

### Data Presentation and Analysis

#### Testing of Hypotheses

After a careful and systematic analysis of the respondent's responses to the research question formulated, hypotheses earlier stated were tested using the Pearson-moment product correlation statistical technique this is considered appropriate because of the relationship involved in the hypotheses.

#### Hypothesis One

**H<sub>0</sub>:** There is no significant relationship between Legislative-Executive conflict and budgeting process in Lagos State.

**H<sub>i</sub>:** There is a significant relationship between Legislative-Executive conflict and budgeting process in Lagos State.

**Table: 1 Correlations**

		Legislative-Executive conflict	Budgeting process
Legislative- Executive conflict	Pearson Correlation	1	.719(**)
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000
	N	100	100
Budgeting process	Pearson Correlation	.719(**)	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	
	N	100	100

\*\* Correlation was significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

The table above illustrates that the Pearson's Correlation  $r = 0.719$  computed for recruitment and selection of federal character and employees' performance was significance with  $p\text{-value} = 0.000$  which is less than  $\text{Alpha} = 0.01$ . This hypothesis is therefore rejected. Thus, confirming the alternative hypothesis that there is a significant relationship between Legislative-Executive conflict and budgeting process in Lagos State.

#### Hypothesis Two

**H<sub>0</sub>:** Legislative-executive conflict does not influence effective public policy implementation in Lagos state.

**H<sub>i</sub>:** Legislative-executive conflict influence effective public policy making and implementation in Lagos state.



**Table 2: Correlations**

		Legislative- Executive conflicts	Public Policy implementation
Legislative executive	Pearson Correlation	1	.823(**)
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000
	N	50	50
Service delivery	Pearson Correlation	.823(**)	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	
	N	50	50

\*\* Correlation was significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

The table above illustrates that the Pearson's Correlation  $r = 0.823$  computed for legislative, executive conflict and public policy formulation and implementation significance with  $p\text{-value} = 0.000$  which is less than  $\text{Alpha} = 0.01$ . This hypothesis is therefore rejected. Thus, confirming the alternative hypothesis that there is a significant relationship between Legislative-Executive conflict and effective public policy making and implementation in Lagos State.

### Discussion of Findings

The study investigates the effects of legislative-executive relations on public policy making and implementation in Lagos state. In achieving the set objectives of the study, two hypotheses were formulated in order to guide the course of the study. These hypotheses were tested for their relevance or otherwise in relation to public policy formulation and implementation. Eighty (80) respondents took part in the study. They are members of the legislative and executive arms of Lagos State government. Hypothesis one which states that there is no significant relationship between Legislative-Executive conflict and budgeting process in Lagos State was rejected therefore positing that there is no significant relationship between Legislative-Executive conflict and budgeting process in Lagos State. This is in tandem with the observation of Rockman (1983), who identifies the causes of executive-legislative conflict to include: pride and personality clash, executive dominance, ignorance of the constitution, functional overlapping and legislative performance of oversight function.

The second hypothesis states that Legislative-executive conflict does not influence effective public policy making and implementation in Lagos state. After the analysis, the null hypothesis was rejected. This implies that legislative-executive conflict influences effective public policy making and implementation in Lagos state. The study identified the negative impacts of executive-legislative conflicts on public policy formulation and implementation in Nigeria. This is in agreement with the views of Nwosu (1998) and Ajayi (2007), that executive-legislative conflict has profound consequences on the policy making and implementation process to the extent that it affects the smooth running of the affairs of the state. Also, Stepan & Skach (1994) in their study uncovered a significant correlation between presidential constitutions and democratic breakdown in a large cross-section of countries, with appropriate controls for other relevant factors. This is usually because of the executive and legislature, though they have different roles to play, yet they sometimes pursue incompatible goals or interests, which often deadlocks the policy making and implementation. This view is also supported by Fatile & Adejuwon (2016) that executive-legislative conflicts have profound consequences on the policy making and implementation process to the extent that it affects the smooth running of the affairs of the state.

### Conclusion

The executive-legislative relations in Nigeria since May 1999 when democracy was again enthroned has been more conflictive than collaborative. The executive and legislative arms are very important institutions in any democratic system. This is because they play very crucial role in the policy making and implementation. The legislatures play

critical roles in the promotion of effective public policy. This function can be discharged through the exercise of the basic legislative functions of law making, representation, and oversight. Through their legislative function, parliaments are responsible for reviewing bills and enacting legislation, amendments, and regulations which are needed to support national development programs. The legislature and executive can work out a synergy to re-focus and re-engineer the policy making and implementation process to promote effectiveness in its administration. This is based on the fact that both the executive and legislature are vehicles for engineering good governance.

For legislators to be able to play their role of representation, oversight, and legislation, it is imperative that there must be a certain degree of cooperation between the three arms of government in policy making (each side must be willing to bargain and compromise in order to get some policy benefits), the legislature must have some capacity to monitor the executive, and the executive needs to be willing to comply with legislative enactments. The collaborative and harmonious relationship between the executive and legislature is crucial for attaining national development because "policy making and policy execution regulated by systems of law and guidelines are segregated into specific operations to achieve specific national objectives. Nigeria requires that the executive and legislature must as a matter of urgency synergize together to engineer the policy making and implementation process that will engender effectiveness in the dispensation of its constitutional obligations.

### Recommendations

Based on the review of the literature, data collection, analysis, and conclusion made from this study, the researcher believes that the following recommendations, if implemented will go a long way in enhancing harmonious legislative-executive relations both at the federal and state levels:

1. Both the executive and legislature should respect and strictly adhere to the tenets of the principles of separation of powers. They should also try to collaborate in necessary areas that would promote the will of the populace.
2. The executive and legislature should deem it necessary always to adopt dialogue in resolving their differences instead of resulting to an outright confrontation that usually deadlocks the policy making and implementation process.
3. The executive and legislature should respect and strictly adhere to the tenets of the principles of separation of powers. Though, consensus may not often be achieved. Nonetheless, it is an exercise worth pursuing if only to sketch the parameters of collaboration in necessary areas that would promote the efficacy of such administration.
4. Both arms of government should embark on regular capacity building on basic conflict resolution and management training to improving their conflict management skills as well as their problem-solving skills.
5. The legislature should evolve different techniques and strategies to strengthen its oversight function, which would enable it to conduct regular and in-depth checks and monitoring on the activities of the executives-ministries, departments, and agencies. This will put the executive on its toes, and it would also make it more service oriented, accountable and transparent.
6. It is very expedient both the legislature and executive should ensure strict adherence to the constitution when issues of the budget are concerned.
7. Both the legislature and executive should deem it necessary always to adopt dialogue in resolving their differences instead of resulting to an outright confrontation that usually deadlocks the policy making and implementation process.

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