

DEMOCRATIZATION AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA UNDER THE FOURTH REPUBLIC

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Abstract: This article explores the rationale for democratisation and political development under the Fourth Republic of Nigeria. In the process of this underlying process, Nigeria is the largest democracy in Africa which experiences unending transition from the military regimes to democratic rules after the cessation of the British rule in 1960. However, the success of the founding election in 1999 was a sine qua non for the national unity of the country as well as for the interest of dispersed territory. Thus, the process of democratisation often assorted to political challenges which have threatened the national unity of the country. The performance has provoked the intervention of the scholars to wonder about the sustainability of the country in the face of the current challenges. The assessment of the first and second wave of democratisation have witnessed this situation between 1974 and 1990, of course, there is hope and fortune for the Nigeria democratic process to establish political arrangements in line with the principles of procedural legitimacy and triangular politics as the major criteria for sustainability of the new democracy in Africa.

Keywords: Democratization, democracy, sustainability, political arrangements

INTRODUCTION

Nigeria is a populous country of an estimated 172 million people with 350 ethnic groups which speak three major languages with several sub-languages. The three common languages are: Hausa, Yoruba, and Ibo. Its territory is geographically extensive and settlement is dispersed. Politically, these features are recognized in a federal system of the country. Despite this diversity, it is possible to make a broad generalisation about the progress and performance of democratisation as the means of assessing the democratic process of the Fourth Republic. The process of democratisation and political development will address the issues about Nigeria's democratic project. First, the trend in political development which informs mobilization of the diversity of a plural society which rooted from the colonial rule, Nigeria as a case study in Africa was colonized by the British through the amalgamation of the Northern and Southern protectorate of 1914. This historical antecedent had established the socio-political and economic relations more complex in the federation of the country. Secondly, democratisation transcends to a self-government rule after the political independence of 1960 which sets the new structures for governance. This political framework was applicable to the Westminster Model in a parliamentary system of government. Such that the statutory functions of the Head of State were distinctively separated from the Head of Government (then).

The root cause of this development was linked to the setting up of the first electoral commission. By the virtue of the Nigerian Electoral Provision Council of 1958, the Electoral Commission of Nigeria was established to preparing ground for the 1959 parliamentary elections under the Westminster Model. This first electoral commission had a chairman and five other members in the federation of the country. Ogbogbo (2009: 48), the electoral commission was organized by the task of the public civil servants to administer it for the conduct of free and fair elections, registration of the political party, delimitation of electoral constituencies, and announcement of the electoral results. The major political parties which contested for the parliamentary and regional elections were: (NPC) Hausas in the Northern Region, (AG) Yorubas in the Western Region, and (NCNC) Ibos in the Eastern Region. Before the general elections, the federal constitution of Nigeria implemented a policy on the proportional representation which specified seats according to the size of each region.

Awe (1960: 103-108) reported the constitutional arrangement adopted in the political affairs of the First Republic which recommended fifty percent of seats to the North, while the other fifty percent of seats will be shared between the West and the East, however, placing the North at political advantage. As a result of this political permutation, the

Northern People Congress (NPC) led the parliamentary government cum TafawaBalewa as the Prime Minister. In this practice, Action Group (AG) from the West, and National Congress for Nigeria and Cameroun (NCNC) from the East formed the broad-based opposition. Subsequently, the outcome of 1959 federation elections was greeted with intra-party and inter-party conflicts in the country. More so, the Prime Minister TafawaBalewa, who was the Head of Government as well as the party leader from the Northern Region had maintained the political popularity throughout the era of the First Republic because of the majority in the parliamentarians.

Table 1 summarises the alternation between civil/military and democratic/authoritarian rule in Nigeria since independence on 1 October, 1960.

Neither democratic rule nor authoritarian/military rule has been able to provide a long-term sustainably legitimate political model for Nigeria. Crises associated with corruption, electoral manipulation and violence have helped propel this alternation. Under these circumstances democracy is susceptible to decay, while military rule can provide only a short-term contingency solution. Civil rule has been in place since 1999 but its decay into a neopatrimonial system of government provides stability but only limited democracy. The concept of patrimonialism is a prevailing feature of politics in many African states, in which democracy in any full sense is compromised with a top down policy of the incumbent power to dictate for the people as against the backdrop of democratic practice. Bratton and Van de Walle (1994: 458) aptly noted that: *“The distinctive institutional hallmark of Africa regimes is neopatrimonialism. In neopatrimonial regimes, the chief executive maintains authority through personal patronage, rather than through ideology or law. As with classic patrimonialism, the right to rule is ascribed to a person rather than office. In contemporary neopatrimonialism, relationship of loyalty and dependence pervade to formal political and administrative system and leaders occupy bureaucratic office less to perform public service than to acquire personal wealth and status. The distinction between private and public interest is purposely blurred. The essence of patrimonialism is the word by public officials of personal favours, both within the state (notably public sector job) and in society (for instance, licenses, contracts, and projects). In returns for material rewards, clients mobilize support and refer all decisions upwards as a mark of deference to (patron)”*

To justify the application of neo-patrimonialism in the current democratic project of Nigeria involves an assessment of promise and performance of the political elite that cut across the federal system. These political elite encourage favouritism at all levels for members of the ruling political party. However, the class of positions ranged from executive president, states governors, local government chairmen and subunits members (ministers/commissioners) are political entourage as well as superpower that determined the economic and political faith of the people. For example, President Olusegun Obasanjo vehemently withheld 10.8 million naira. (Adeniyi 2011: 21) noted that the fund was a statutory allocation for the Lagos State Local Government Areas. The seizure of this fund by the president started in 2004 when Governor Bola Tinubu created 17 additional local governments in Lagos State to make 37 local government areas. In this sense, President Olusegun Obasanjo deliberately punished the people of Lagos State based on the ground that the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN) was the ruling party in Lagos. In this sense, the President Obasanjo may have refused the allocation because of the benefit for Governor Bola Tinubu. In this connection, President Obasanjo may have refused the allocation because of the benefit for Governor Bola Tinubu. The election of the Late Umar Musa Yar’adua of 2007 was favourable for the release of the allocation to the Lagos State when Governor RajiFashola assumed office in the same year with the president.

The optimism surrounding the transition to a democratic system of government, which was inaugurated on May 29, 1999, and headed by President Olusegun Obasanjo, was tempered by the daunting array of challenges carried over from the past military regimes which confronted the new and inexperienced democratic system (Bratton and Lewis (2000:1-2). The establishment of new institutions, the development of effective political procedures, and the resolution of numerous policy problems presented urgent issues to be addressed in the nascent democracy. Among the more pressing concerns confronted by the new government was economic policy. A combination of sagging global markets, chronic mismanagement, and endemic corruption fostered an extended economic malaise, and much of the Nigerian public anticipated that better governance should be reflected in improved economic conditions. Indeed a challenge for democratic government was and remains how to harness economic reform of democracy and democracy for economic reform in order to meet the hopes and aspirations of the people after the hardship they had experienced during the military regimes.

This study also interrogates whether this current phase of evolution to a democratic system of government will be a lasting solution to political decay in Nigeria. The quest for answers is generally linked to the process of the third wave of democratisation particularly African countries that have adopted liberal democracy. These new democracies display, to various degrees, continuities with past authoritarian processes. Writing in 1997, (Bratton and Van de Walle 1997:6-10) observed the contemporary patterns of African transition to democratic system of government as one way for autocratic leadership to broaden support for itself other willing political agents with a softer, more

liberal form of authoritarian rule, but one which is far from accountable. This calls into question the extent to which a new democratic government in Africa can be described as democracy? And to what extent do processes of regime change in Africa resembles democratisation? To put it another way, is Nigeria democratising or de-democratising in her current democratic project.

Theories of democratization

The concept of democratization is a new political vocabulary for the analysis of public agents in a democratic system in this modern era. However, the political analysts in the various fields have assembled to construct vast empirical theories in line with the global politics on the process of democratization which emerged in the Western countries through the evolution which took different political patterns. First and foremost, democratization is a relative term of democracy. Huntington (1991: 13-16) labelled the concept as a period or evolution that comes in form of growing waves which systematically transcends in the arena of world politics. However, democratization is also a group of democratic transitions from non-democratic regimes to democratic regimes. Alumona (2010: 98) observes that democratization is a process that occurs over a period of time, where the state and the entire populace are the major actors who must show commitment to ensure that sustainable democracy operates well in the entire society. Diamond (1997: xiv) stated the third wave of democratization has transformed the balance of political regimes in the world. Whitehead (2002: 26-27) added that democratization is best understood as a complex, long term, dynamic, and open ended process. It consists of progress towards a more ruled-based, more consensual and more participatory type of politics.

In a similar vein, Huntington (1991: 109) argued that the concept of democratization should be shifted from how the authoritarian government collapsed, to the processes of democratic institutions. These processes take different forms but a typical occurrence starts when the principle officers of government are chosen through competitive elections in which the bulk of population participate. Also the democratic government should be changed and selected through the model of procedural legitimacy. Procedural legitimacy, Smith (2003: 275) aptly noted, resides with democratic forms of government as pro-democracy movement in a healthy political space with regard to the elite and electorate competing for political power. Apart from this argument, Huntington (1991: 50) maintained that procedural legitimacy in a political system that reflects ability of the voters to choose their rulers through elections. Subsequently, if the rulers failed to perform, they lose legitimacy, they are defeated in elections and different set of rulers takes over.

The evolution of democratisation in this modern era came with assorted views of scholars that have grasped various ideas in delineating the prevailing political term and locates it to the context of practice in the contemporary democratic system of government. The empirical connection between the theory of Huntington and Bratton are vast in the literatures of democratisation. Indeed, Huntington described the impact of democratisation as the establishment of a democratic government through the form of election. Election serves as life of democracy and an end to authoritarian regimes, while Bratton (1997:194-195) viewed democratisation from different perspectives which involves the construction of participation and competitive political institutions: "The process of democratisation begins with political challenges to authoritarian regimes, advances through the political struggles over liberalization, and requires the installation of a freely elected government. It concludes only when the democratic rules become firmly institutionalised as well as valued by political actors at large". Therefore, democratisation is an open ended process which extends to the pinnacle of the state for national integration of diverse national, particularly African countries which have currently linked up to the deliberative democracy.

More so, democratisation involves regime transition from authoritarian regimes and concludes when democratic government is first installed. The end of transition is marked by cessation of overt disputes about the rule of the political game and the establishment of a new procedural type that could accord legitimacy to the elite through the citizen's involvement in balloting. On the other hand, democratisation as the regime transition to democracy can be said to have occurred only when a regime has been installed on the basis of a competitive election, freely and fairly conducted within a matrix of civil liberties, with result accepted by all participants. The acceptance of the validity of founding elections by losing parties is crucial because it marks the uncertainty agreement on democratic system of government. In the same sense, smooth transition to a democratic government is best distinguished according to the mechanism of the regime installation rather than by added requirement of the alternative leaders. Thus, few African countries have fulfilled the obligation to democracy, but in the process of operating this task, this study focuses primarily on the openness and fairness of the electoral process on the willingness of election losers, and gainers.

In this literature, Bratton (1997:198) aptly examined the founding elections in Africa countries immediately after 1990 as many political offices were opened to electoral competition. For example, the head of government was relatively opened to multiparty system which engaged choices in the governance of life. Another dimension which established new development in the movement for democratisation in Africa was the effective opposition which

confronted authoritarian regimes of one party system. In this scenario, urban protest movement against dominant political party was constructed in line with preceded process of competitive elections. The leaders emerged to meet this challenge in very few instances. The distinction between convergence and splintering of opposition forces is nicely captured by contrasting Republic of Congo and Zambia.

In another sense, Bratton (1997: 201) correspondingly expressed the founding election with a view to free and fair as the criteria for legalizing competitive elections. Thus, most African elections were disputed based on the platform which it stands on because incumbent and oppositions clashed over campaigns and voting procedures. In the same connection, opposition leaders claimed that voters registration list were either outdated, disenfranchising large members of eligible citizens especially young citizens who were expected to opt for change in the political systems. The credibility of a competitive elections are commonly observed by various agents ranging from domestic and international which are permitted to evaluate the elections for international standard.

Apart from conducting elections, Bratton (1997:203-205) further mentioned that other useful innovations include election outcomes, participation and completion are germane to processes of democratisation. This political innovation emerges in the turnout for elections within the wing of the incumbent and opposition parties in African politics. First, the transition from one party to multiparty competition was recorded as daunting in few African countries. For example, in Malawi and Zambia, even in Nigeria, transition elections had much more uncertain outcome than election conducted previously under single-party regimes in which there was only one candidate for the presidency who won without competing with other candidates. In another vein, election which is conducted under multiparty and the incumbent power holder was dropped as the election witness transparency under free and fair. In Africa incumbent party enjoys electoral advantages over the opposition political parties, but such advantages were permanently marked in Africa's neopatrimonial regimes where the chief executive monopolises and rule through prebend.

Another remarkable view in this literature, Bratton (1997:206-207) concluded that the electoral participation and elite competition are combined to evaluate the character of founding elections right from campaign level to the outcome of the result. In African scenario, the political elite are often able to control the process of political competition so that they can come out on top. Even where elections resulted in the ouster of entrenched strongman, new leaders quickly lapsed into autocratic and patrimonial practices of their predecessor. Thus, the victors in Africa's elections are often simply old-guard politicians who chose the right moment to break with the past. Observers have charged that recent political changes in Africa have not directly involved overall citizens in the process of election from the campaign level which is the foundation of the political institution. However, the impediment to this issue was informed by the political behaviour of the old-guard politician, who wants power at the absence of low political education.

In another vein, Adesoji, (2006: 43) established various approaches to the concept of democratisation. The transitional approach emphasizes political processes and elite initiatives and choices as accounting for moves from authoritarian ruler to liberal. This connotes that certain actions, choices, and strategies of political elite are beneficial to democratic institutions. In a similar vein, democratisation stands on interrelationships of the political elite to organize for effective political structures which could help in overall achievement for the people in the area of power, economic, social and political, as they gradually change through history which provides constraints and opportunities as it also drives political elite and others along a historical trajectory in liberal democracy. Jayasuriya (1994: 143) succinctly argued that democratisation is the movement towards realisation of a democratic order which needs to be located in actors and social movements of civil society groups. The civil society group is an area of human activity which was primarily directed at the satisfaction of political needs which require an association more greater than the family affairs. Schlumberger (2007: 106) expressed that the concept of democratisation and democracy are combined to established political institutions. In 1980, democratisation was viewed as a process shaped by strategic actors rather than by structural socio-economic prerequisite. These actors determine the outcome of transitional process by their interests, perceptions, strategies, and interactions. In a similar sense, democratisation is a process which leads to democratic political system as an open arena for the human interaction.

The notion of democratization was discussed by Acharya (2003: 377), who explicitly explained the significance of democratisation to mean transnational approach in a regional politics of the world. This framework described the mechanism through which each continent changed from authoritarian regimes to democratic rules with the influence of foreign policy. The following suggestions have contributed to the evolution of democratisation: firstly, democratic transition may create unanticipated moments of boldness in foreign policy, which could break long-standing stalemates in regional conflicts. This is partly because of the impulsive move by newly democratic states to distance themselves from the policies of their authoritarian predecessors.

Table 1: Governments and Regimes in Nigeria since Independence

Government/Regime	Democratic/Authoritarian	Duration	Basis (election? Coup?)	Comments
Civil Rule	Democratic	1959-1966	Coup	Political crisis
Military	Authoritarian	1966-1966	Coup	Counter Coup
Military	Authoritarian	1966-1975	Coup	Counter Coup
Military	Authoritarian	1975-1979	Election	Transition
Civil Rule	Democratic	1979-1983	Coup de' tat	Political Crisis
Military	Authoritarian	1983-1985	Coup	Counter Coup
Military	Authoritarian	1985-1993	Elections	Political Crisis
Interim/Military	Authoritarian	Six Months	Nil	Palace Coup
Military	Authoritarian	1993-1999	Elections	Transition
Civil Rule	Democratic	1999-2007	Elections	Crisis/Corruption
Civil Rule	Democratic	2007-2011	Election	Crisis/Corruption
Civil Rule	Democratic	2011-?		

Source: Author's compilation

Secondly, by seeking a broader range of views on foreign policy and permitting greater domestic discussion and debate over foreign policy goals, democracies may be able to offer alternative solutions to existing regional conflicts. In fact, contrary to a popular belief that newly installed democracies destabilise their neighbourhood by seeking to export their revolution, one finds evidence that democracies often deal creatively and responsibly with their neighbours, including those with whom they might have been embroiled in conflict. Thirdly, democratisation creates more domestic transparency in ways beneficial to regional understanding and trust. Transition to democratic rule brings in its wake availability of greater information about a state's national security and financial policies and assets. This could reduce suspicions among neighbours and expand regional security and economic co-operation. Fourthly, Democratisation may lead to more open and regularised interactions among states, reducing the importance of inter-personal contact. Lastly, Democratisation produces greater openness and the rule of law not just within states, but also between them. Rule of law in the domestic context often leads to demands for rule-based interactions in the regional arena. This can be more conducive to regional collective problem solving.

In this opinion, Bratton (2004:1) noted that democratisation and state are two fundamentals threshold which accommodate democratic rules prevailing in the African societies. Similarly, democratisation establishes orderliness among different civil groups to stair the political affairs on the principles of democracy which also helps the state to function effectively by the political wheel of the people to accommodate these features: authority, legitimacy and bureaucracies. Carbon and Memoli (2012: 2) correspondingly viewed that democratisation and state-building are key terms in the international agenda as both are processes which are often evoked together, however, they refer to two analytically distinct underlying concepts, namely, democracy and state.

The argument of democratisation was accompanied by the pressing explanations of scholars to resolve at the universal meaning. These magnanimous efforts have uninsured the risks taking in the practice of democratic institutions. Therefore, Huntington (1991: 294-316) has indicated the general obstacles to democratisation, particularly in the new countries which adopted democratic practices after 1991. These obstacles include: (a) The political inexperience which marked the political systems of the new arrivals to democratic government after 1990. This dramatic experience which spanned 1990, and was considered as a set of democratic tests in the history of third wave democratisation. Within this period, some third world countries were still under the leadership of authoritarian regimes in which Nigeria was among the political backsliders. (b) The political leaders that were in power during the authoritarian regimes between and 1990, later confronted with democratic attitude after the third wave of democratisation as instrument of change. Wherein, the new political leaders that emerged after that year established democracy in line with undemocratic ideology that worked against the process of democratisation. (c) A profoundly anti-democratic culture would impede the spread of democratic norms in the society, deny the legitimacy to the democratic institutions, and thus greatly complicate if not prevented the emergence and effective functioning of the institutions, e.g. Islam, traditional Confucianism, and undemocratic movements. (d) Lastly, high levels of poverty and inequality impede the growth of democratisation because citizens cannot see material benefits from democratic forms

Catalysts to democratisation in Nigeria

There is exigency needs to explain the political forces which accelerate democratisation in the Fourth Republic of Nigeria. According to Huntington (1991: 41), who postulated the circumstances that informed the third wave of democratisation which are in varying degrees. However, each country's political background in the authoritarianism is the principal premise of democratisation of the global world particularly among developing countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America. The evolution of democratisation is a transition from undemocratic to democratic which undergo through internal arrangements either by the people or the authoritarian government to change the political character of the state. Basically, regimes change generally depends on the nature of history, in fact, the regimes which have moved toward democracy in the third wave were diverse. They include one-party systems, military regimes, and personal dictatorship.

In the case of Nigeria in Africa, Ihonubere (1996: 194) noted that it is easy for the military cabals, largely because it legal monopolises the means of coercion through guns, bombs and armored tanks, to intervene in politics, as against the votes of the people that accord legitimacy to the government. To be sure, fractionalisation of the ruling elites, and fragility of the state helps to explain why military has emerged as the most powerful contenders in struggle for power in contemporary Nigeria. However, two novel developments occurred in 1993 where members of the political class openly invited conservative army officers to intervene, and held consultation with them before they did so, particularly with the northern oligarchy. Ikpe (2000: 156-157) maintained that the patrimonial attitude of General Babangida increased in number for support of the annulled June 12, election of 1993. The military Head of State recruited clients and supporters all over the country, his primary support came from the north. This is because he was such an ardent believer in Northerner dominance of Nigerian politics. This research argues that the acclaimed winner of the June 12 election was a Southerner, an undisputed lead, forcefully demonstrates this commitment. Every available evidence indicates that any power shift from North to the South was unacceptable to the Northern military and political elites who have dominated power since 1960.

Another implication for the management of the country was the establishment of the Interim National Government (ING) which was headed by Chief Ernest Shonekan, who hailed from the South West. His government was used to appease the southerners for non actualisation of the June 12 election. Despite this development, there was a considerable violence in the South West, particularly in Lagos. The failure of the Interim National Government to integrate the affairs of the country culminated in the wild-wind coup of General San Abacha in 1993. General Abacha's leadership in the country was more disastrous because his despicable attitude toward fascism was dramatically established. Thus, the basic success of General Abacha's coup was not a surprising one in the political system of Nigeria but, it was a game plan with General Babangida upon the leadership of the country which should come from the North. Ikpe (2000: 158) reported that Abacha used everything against Nigerian interest, against the Nigerian people, and only for himself, and family. Not only the security apparatus, even the political and economic system were used for his benefit. In his tenure, right to the oil bloc was distributed to the northerners particularly those that were loyal to him.

In this sense, Westra (1998: 154) stated the process of Abacha's dictatorship in November, 1993 in the establishment of a fascist regime where he disbanded all elected bodies, such as state legislative, thirty houses of state assemblies, local councils, and all political activities. He also suspended the 1979 constitution, including all provision for human rights it contained. Moreover, in April 1994, a Civil Disturbances Tribunal was established with power to impose death penalty, capital offences, and reviewed punishment by including unrest crimes and attempted murderer. In May 1994, some supporters of the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) were arrested including Ken Saro-wiwa.

The minority communities under the regime of Abacha, both the South-South and the South-West suffered different circumstances. Ihonvber (1996:214) explained that before the death of Ken Saro-wiwa, there was a peaceful demonstration in the country on environmental pollution with regard oil spillage which damaged the source of economic income of the people from fishing. Abacha was less concerned to address the fundamental problems facing the people of Ogoni community. There was a draconian attempt by deploying soldiers to different strategic locations in the areas. Basically, the inter community classes among the neighbours, such as Ndoki, Andoni, and Okrika were emasculated. Thereafter, considerable arrest was made which included the leader. Consequently, the leader and others members were hanged to death on the 10 November, 1995. The reason behind this action was the leverage over the environment which serves as economic source for the nation under General Abacha authoritarian regime.

The evolution of democratisation in Nigeria started with the protest which was established by the pro-democracy groups with active members from the South West, and few members from the North and East also joined to face out the military rule. This movement was engineered from the South-West, the Yoruba community through Afenifere

group (Peace Lovers) and the EgbeomoOduduwa (Descendant of Yoruba). Ihonvbere (1996: 211) opines that these tribal groups filled the political environment with new ideas in the formation of the National Democratic Coalition (NDECO) and Campaign for Democracy (CD) in 1994. The principal goal of the movement was to reinstating the June 12 mandate of ChiefMoshoodAbiola. Among its prominent members were respected Nigerian who played significant role during the early years of independence, notably Anthony Enahoro, Michael Ajasin, as well as intellectuals and new generation of politicians, such as: KofoworolaAkerere, BolajiAKinyemi, Ralph Obiora, GaniFawehinmi, and a host of others.

The political struggles by the citizens of Nigeria corroborated with the civil society groups in the opposition of the authoritarian regimes of General Sani Abacha. Perhaps, in these movements, Ihonvbere (1996:212), there were ups and downs with regard to struggle as the executive of the Nigerian Labour Congress was dissolved, while the Campaign for Democracy and National Democratic Coalition members were promptly arrested and detained. The student of Edo State University organised a public protest about ethnic cleansing in Ogoniland and various indiscriminate arrest, about 25 persons were reportedly killed by the police and army under Abacha regime. Therefore, under this regime the country was at the stage of collapse.

The position of Abacha was unpopular with considerable opposition that was mounted to discredit his agenda in the country. The military juntas established strategies to gain the popularity in the country by introducing people to new development. And this was method of divide and rule particularly in the South-West region that support the June 12 mandate. Kraxberger (2004: 421-425) explained that the constitutional conference was introduced to remove various political tensions with a view to creating more states in the country. This development splits the ideas of Afenifere (Yoruba Group) from the South-West into pro and anti –military rule. Despite this fact, the group in Ibadan had surmounted for the boycott of the National Conference, Ekiti chapter vowed to attend it, in the interest of state creation which was eventually achieved. The adamant of Ekiti for participation in National Conference of 1994 however gave birth to the emergence of Oodua People Congress (OPC), a powerful ethnic militia as well as vulnerable group complimented by the youths to demonstrate over Abacha's autocratic rule particularly in the South West. The soldiers have arrested prominent people from the area such as: GaniFawahimi, Chief OluFalae; Nobel laureate Wole Soyinka, General Alani Akinrinmade, and others sought refuge in exile. This military action provoked the vulnerability of youths in the crisis.

Kraxberger (2004: 425-426) maintained that it was in this environment of political reposition and ferment that the Oodua People Congress (OPC) was formed, its principal leader was OtunbaGaniyu Adams. The rationale for the creation of Oodua People Congress (OPC) was to question the activities of the military as well as national integration of the Yoruba people in the country and diaspora. The justification of this was the annulment of the June 12, in 1993 (then) General Abacha was second in command to General Babangida. The second phase of the ethnic militia at the tune of 1994 was a significant improvement on intellectual members which cut across different professions from the South West. The Oodua People Congress rejected the divide and rule politics of Abacha regime. Similarly, the OPC became a strong association from the descendant of Oduduwa in Nigeria and diaspora to challenge the military authority of General Abacha on the subject that: "Abacha must go". The OPC proclaimed war against federal government for the marginalization of the Yorubas, and pointed to the annulment of Abiola's success in the history of democracy in Nigeria.

The regime of Abacha was a despicable type as well as immoral from every quarter of the world. This makes the international community to wonder how the Nigerian would survive under the autocratic agenda of the military juntas. There was no improvement on human lives, despite this hardship; political and socio-economic deterioration accrued in staggering, poverty, unemployment, corruption, malnutrition which threatened the political ecology. Because of these aforementioned challenges, various international communities have committed their efforts in the entrenchment of democratic prospects that could improve on the unity of Nigeria through diplomatic interventions.

The patterns of diplomatic interventions issued by the international communities were in varying degrees. Westra (1998: 154) reported that the principal mission was registered by President Clinton of United States, who delegated Jesse Jackson as a special emissary for mediation upon the action of Abacha in Nigeria. Harneit-Sievers (1998: 356) justified that there were gross violation of human rights under the Abacha regime between 1993 and 1998. Nigeria had become a pariah state against which a number of international sanctions had been imposed. Because of this recalcitrant policy of Abacha, Ihonvbere (1996: 215) noted that Nigeria was suspended from the Commonwealth of Nations following the motion moved by President Nelson Mandela of South Africa in 1995. Apart from these accounts, the European Union and other Western Nations reviewed diplomatic relations, and supply of arms has been suspended. Consequently, Sessay and Ukeje (1997: 38) reported that Nigeria was given a two-year deadline within which it should democratise and impose its human rights records.

In a nutshell, Abacha died in 1998 by short illness at Aso Rock Villa Abuja. Some Nigerians wondered that the nature of his death was either apple or sexual enterprise with an Indian lady. Historically, the aberration of Nigerian political system was dominated by military regimes for 29 years. Therein Abacha and Babangida regimes were the worse in the history of Nigeria because there were impasses in politics and socio-economic which would have driven the operation of democratisation cum affirmation of the June 12 elections that was considered as free and fair by the international observers. Therefore, the fortune of democratisation in developed countries of today lied on the past historical backgrounds which open to political pressures. The first and second wave of democratisations had witnessed this development. Nigeria as a case study in Africa should not divulge to organise a viable political development for sustainability.

Challenges to democratisation in Nigeria

Nigeria as the largest democracy in Africa often witnessed several transitions which could hold the unity of the country stable. But the transitions were constructed on the political structure of the unitary system of government which informed various electoral decays as manifest in the institutional designed. For this fact, Nigerian democracy reflects underdevelopment. Thus, democratisation process in Nigerian political system is technically structured by large scale challenges which are combined to obstruct her fifteen years of democratic project. However, these challenges are historically linked to internal politics where democratic government often informed by major political actions for the process of institutional design among the political agents in the federation of Nigeria. Therefore, this study is akin to discuss relevant issues that surround representative government in Nigeria from the literature of scholars in the field of social sciences. It was observed that the general challenges of democratisation and political development attempt to explain the crises which faced the first and second waves of democratisation also appeared in the third Wave of democratisation, particularly the countries which joined liberal democracy after 1990.

The military was considered as the major player which often appears at the corridor of power for the governance of the country on the account of political crisis between the incumbent power holders and the political contenders struggling to take the power through electoral process. Yaqub (2004: 89) noted that the 1966 military coup was bloody because it claimed lives of few parliamentarians; they are Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa, Akintola, Sir Ahmadu Bello and a host of others. In a similar vein, in 1979 General Olusegun Obasanjo as the Head of State successfully transformed the country into a democratic government which elected Alhaji Shehu Shagari in the Second Republic. The democratic transition was emasculated by a military coup staged in 1983 and a counter military coup led by Major General Ibrahim Babangida in 1985. The military government started a democratic transition that was to transfer power to a civilian government between 1990 and 1993. The elections were conducted without actualization of the political mandate for civil rule. Therefore, this translates to the opinion of the people to wonder about the unity of Nigeria under the Fourth Republic. Ake (2001: 6) juxtaposed that the military intervention in the civilian rules was unintentional in Africa but by the character of politics that engender military regime.

In the same vein, it is necessary to address the issue of minority rights and majority rule in Nigeria in the present democratic projects. This issue largely contributes to the rise and fall of a new democratic system. In the current democratic dispensation of Nigeria, there is much gap between the opposition in the Freedom. This framework accounts for the population of each ethnic state in the federation. For example, Hausa/Fulani which dominates North East, North South and North West are recognised as majority. While, the South West, South South, and South East are also recognized as minority ethnic groups. In this sense, majority rule in the context of democratisation is based on population advantage over the minority rights. The justification of this is resource control being the right of the Ogoni people. Dibua (2005: 5) explained the environmental degradation and the effort to recourse control by the minorities communities in Nigeria. This political formula engendered danger in the political system of Nigeria, and this practice which was operated in the First and Second Republics became a stereotype in the current democratic project as representatives are affiliated with their respective nationalities in the Fourth Republic. Suberu (2003: 1-4) observed the minority tension and protest in Nigeria which lies in their long disadvantage as position emerged in the political system. This contextual challenge translated to ethnic conflict in the north, among the non-Hausa-Fulani communities, and in Rivers State, among the oil producing communities.

As regards this fact, the issue of minority rights and majority rule started after the political independence of 1960. Thus, Nigeria is ethnically diverse with 250 groups, among the minority groups are: Yoruba, Igbo, Ibibio, Tiv, Nupe, Igala, Ogoni, Urobo, Itsekiri, and a host of others. The Kanuri, and Fulani groups have affinity with Hausa. Therefore, the political power has overstayed in the hands of the majority Hausa. International Crisis Group (2006: 15) supported the view that the Yoruba, Igbo, and Ogoni are under the leadership of the Hausa groups in the country. Meanwhile, the PDP as the ruling party in the country had designed a new agenda in the application of the unitary democratic system under the Fourth Republic for the power to be shared among the six geo-political zones in the federation of the country. This political arrangement is undemocratic as well dangerous to the national unity of

the country. President Olusegun Obasanjo (Yoruba, South West) 1999-2007, late President Umar Musa Yar'adua (Hausa, North West) 2007-2009, and President Goodluck Jonathan (Ijaw, South South) 2009-2015. There is crisis/disagreement in the political arrangement because the Hausa vowed to return the political power to the North in line with the agenda of the ruling party (PDP). This is because Hausa/Fulani has not completed their tenure in the leadership of the country with regard late Umar Musa Ya'adua in 2009. This study argues that the next political zone should be South East (Ibo) according to the sharing formula. The President Goodluck Jonathan may contest for re-election in 2015 to complete his two tenure. In a nutshell, the government of each leadership in the country should run two tenure as the alluding politics of the PDP.

The political violence transformed to minority struggle for secession from the sovereign government of Nigeria. This aberration consequently resulted in the emancipation of ethnic militias in the South West, South South and South East. Among the ethnic militias such as Oodual People's Congress (OPC), Ijaw Youth Movement (IYM), Movement for Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) et cetera. Exceptionally, Arewa People's Congress (APC) or Arewa Consultative Forum (ACF) is the majority ethnic nationality that operates in the north. Perhaps, each nationality sometimes disagreed with the central government over national issues which always result in crisis.

The resolution to the challenges for the future existence of Nigeria was informed by the establishment of the national conference as a political avenue to discuss about the national issues/unity with the assembly of people from the six geopolitical zones. The political debate that arose in 2005 during President Olusegun Obasanjo government was initiated as National Question. Musa Abutudu (2010: 25) aptly observed that: *"the national question is the perennial debate as how to order the relationship between the different ethnic, linguistic, and cultural groupings so that they have the same rights and privileges, access to power and equitable share of national resources; debate as to whether or not we are on the right course towards the goal of nationhood; debate as to whether our constitution facilitates or inhibit our march to nationhood, or in between the goal itself is mistaken and we should seek other political arrangement to facilitate our search for legitimacy and development"*

Another view about the issue of the National question worth mentioning is, Ogundowole (2003: vii) who philosophically explained national question as a phenomenon in the investigation of human existence on the basis of natural circumstances that orchestrates people's identity for a nationhood which enhance means of identifying as well as resolving political structure of the country. From this examination, this study argues that national question as a political approach in the establishment of future existence for political development. Additionally, Ogundowole (2003: 121-122) stressed the political ideology of the present elite to control the affairs of the country through power sharing. This approach was considered as a political dilemma that would embody violence and hatred among the political elite.

Corruption in Nigeria becomes the major enterprise and it dominates the political system to the extent that every public and private organisations are inflicted with the syndrome. This indication contributes to democratic failure in the past and the present government. Johnston Michael (1995:5) defined corruption as act of abusing the public roles and resources for private benefit. Funke (1991: 166) averred that the word corruption denotes something which is immoral and dishonest. This study shows that corruption in public life is usually associated with actions which devalue certain principles of trust and fairness which people hold dear. However, tribalism, racism, bribery and graft, undue influence and pressure are equally forms of corruption which exists in the federation of Nigeria. The justification of this position in fact, every national assignment by top bureaucratic members is a mechanism for corruption because there is kick-back approach in the business. The kick-back approach is the gain or commission from the contract award to agents. They have white partners from Europe that partake in this unfair job.

The failure of elections in Nigeria can be attributed to many factors. Enojo (2010: 89) emphasises electoral violence which since independence has always been part of the political process. Anifowose and Babawale (2003: 64) added that the 2003 general elections were rigged by the elites in power. Ojo (2008: 21) and Okolie (2010:1-2) are of the view that the 2007 general elections were the worse in the history of election administration in Nigeria with both international and local observers concluding that it was badly flawed. Awopeju (2011: 1) and Obakhado and Imhanlahimi (2009: 10) have claimed that low participation in the 2007 and 2011 presidential elections was due to loss of confidence by the people in electoral processes. Rawlence and Albin-Lacey (2007: 1-2) characterized Nigerian elections in terms of stolen 'rights' because they were marred by extraordinary displays of rigging and intimidation of voters in many areas throughout the country. In many states, very little voting took place as ballot papers were diverted to the offices and homes of government officials and participant to be filled with fake results.

On the other hand, one interesting area in democratisation of Nigeria has been inter-governmental relations within the federating states. From 1999 to the present there have been robust in term of dealing with national issues which are germane to democracy, including revenue allocation and management of national crisis in the federation of the

country. The three institutional components of government in Nigeria include are, central government, state government, and local governments, which are collectively combined as the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) offices were established in the state and local government areas. The political structures are stratified, such that, the president is the head of state of the federation, while, governors are executive heads of the component states, and each local government area has a chairman as its executive head. Apart from these structural accounts which have impacted on democratisation, another relevant perspective which should be divulged is political opposition in the country is often constructed in line with multi-party electoral system. In a nutshell, the presidential election in the federation is nostalgia in rigging at the state levels through political clients of the same party. For example, PDP as the super political party in the federation of Nigeria has the central power to the subordinate states and local governments in the national matters.

Oromareghake (2013:24-29) has argued that democratisation in Nigeria has been deeply compromised by various forms of electoral malpractice since political independence in 1960, and credible elections have not been forthcoming. It is true that the 2011 elections were judged free and fair by the international and internal observers, but there was low turn up by the electorate. Momoh (2006:71) assessed the Nigerian experience as de-democratisation between 1999 and 2003 on the ground that the responsible leaders with the interest of the people have not emerged which is the major consideration of democracy as well as making democracy feasible.

In the literature of Bratton (2008:3), the general obstacles to democratic elections in Africa are highlighted as follows: (1) Elections are struggles over access to and control of resources, (2) African leaders are political demagogues, (3) African election campaigns have been exercises in manipulation by politicians (4) Campaign strategies in Africa feature material inducement and political intimidation, (5) the modus operandi of elections in Africa is open to vote buying, (6) Africa elections are prone to large scale violence (7) In sum, these features amount to denial of citizens' freedom to express their electoral preferences. Nigeria, as a case study in Africa, conforms with many of these features. Nevertheless, the 2007 federation elections in April which featured contests for the federal presidency, state governorships and legislative assemblies at state and national levels promised a political watershed. This study investigates whether Nigeria could conduct credible elections that would usher in credible leaders that have interest of the citizens at heart.

Political development theories and practice

Political development offers a broad range of meanings in the literature of political science but its discussion focuses on the evolution of changes which astronomically diffuse to different sets of people to transform its socio-political system from tradition to modernisation. This explanation was justified by Deutsch (1961: 493) that political development rhymes with social mobilisation as a process of overall change which happens to substantial part of countries which are moving from traditional to modernism. Thus, these changes influence and sometimes transform political behaviour which is fused with historical situations and virtually between politics and economic development. Apart from this explanation, Nye (1967: 418-419) noted that political development is best used to refer to the recurring problem of relating governmental structures and processes to change. Virtually, modernization and capacity of political structures cope with social change, to the extent, it prevails in some times. This context generally assumes that structures and processes co-exist with legitimacy for the people's to support for as output desire. The legitimacy and effectiveness become relevant when the sectors of population participate in the process of maintaining governmental structures overtime.

The language of political development means more than the aforementioned literatures, Pye (1965: 5-14) observed certain aspects of characteristics from the explicit postulation which touches the overall activities of human existence in a democratic state. Similarly, the political development should be synonymous with democratic institutions and practices which is an essential ingredient of modernisation.

The literature, Olsen (1968: 699-700) argued over the proposition of Martin Lipset on the context that political democracy is highly dependent on socio-economic expansion in such realms as industrialization, urbanization, and education. The argument of this theory is viewed from another version of meaning as the broader process of national political development of which democratisation is only one possible aspect which explains process of democracy in the modern states. Therefore, political development as the institutionalization of political organizations and procedures with level of institutionalization is determined by the adaptability in an organized society, complexity, autonomy, and coherence or unity of a political system. Eckstein (1982: 454) supported with the view that political development is associated with democratisation and other integrity values which are accrued with professionalism in the modern political system.

More importantly, Tanter (1967: 150-151) explained political development in line with the practices of the modern political system. However, system analysis offers a broad range of governmental structures as the people and the

government socially interacts through the web of demands and supports. The political interaction is designed to balance the power of the state. In the same connection, demands is integrated and processed in the political system for the output by the government and it comes inform of laws. Basically, if the demands of the people are covered, there is possibility for political instability in the state. This outcome opens a political opportunity for the opposition party to gain legitimacy for the next elections in the country. For example, the procedural alteration of the Democratic Party (DP) and Republican Party (RP) in the politics of the United States.

Rutten (1991: 265-266) aptly explained the correlation between the concept of politics and economic development as the mainstream of public policies which are significant in the modern political institutions. Subsequently, economic policy is made by the incumbent power holders as the political gain which reflects people's welfare in the political system. This framework has been described as the transformation of structures and the successes of the overall performance. Pious and Ojonemi (2014: 203) maintained that political development appreciates the tenets of representative democracy which gives room for effective mass participation in decision making process in government. Democratisation of the polity simply refers to a situation where the people are allowed to freely elect or select their representatives in accordance with democratic ethics and principles as the only game in town.

In view of these aforementioned literatures, Nigeria as a nation succinctly established the principal election in 1959 which put the country on the track of a democratic regime. This achievement was opened to process of managing the political affairs of the country that is geographically dispersed. Thus, the colonial structure was established by the leadership of Lord Lugard in 1914. This process had set forth for the emergence of the colonial constitution for the management of Nigeria regionally. The political development (then) had informed other constitutional arrangements in the country. One of these was the General Lyttleton constitution, which march the country to the political independence in 1960.

Ogbogbo (2009: 48) reported that Governor General Lyttleton established a federal constitution which introduced some changes in the country's electoral laws. It was therefore felt that there was a need to set up an electoral body for the purpose instead of the previous ad hoc arrangements. By virtue of Nigerian (Electoral Provision) Order-in-Council of 1958, the electoral commission of Nigeria was established. Subsequently, the commission released the guidelines for the subsequent elections. It is instructive to note that this marked the beginning of the management of electoral matters in Nigeria. This commission conducted the general elections of 1959 and 1964. These elections were marred by electoral violence and allegation of rigging. The failure of these elections provoked the military to intervene in the politics of Nigeria in 1966.

There was no moral justification for the military past interventions in Nigerian politics which started from the April coup de' tat of 1966, it manifested as the agent of political development. Ihonubere (1996: 194-196) stated that military coups in Nigeria was an aberration in the process of competing for power of the state. The rationale behind the unconstitutional approach was by political, social and economic unrest in the country. Whereas, the involvement of the military in the Nigerian Politics has opened the country to underdevelopment in the socio-economic live. To justify this position was the civil war which claimed lives and property between 1967 and 1970 was an example in the history of Nigeria. In another view, Military regimes are not recognised for the prospects and political development by the international community and national intellectuals. Consequently, military is considered as an agent of political development when it co-exists with a democratic rule. Dunmoye (2008: 177-178) aptly noted the essential functions of the military existence as agent of democratisation in relation to social interaction with other arms of government for the survival of the state in this post-modern period. Not only the performance and legitimacy of the military considered when, acting as an arm of the state and an important institution of society, which is central to the democratic state.

The emergence of the Fourth Republic in 1999 with the founding elections which installed democratic systems in the federation of Nigeria was a hallmark in progress and performance as it brings the government closer to the people for hope and confidence in the institutions that were established. This political achievement was distinctive from the First and Second Republics of (1960-1966) and (1979-1983) which lived for short periods.

Sustainability of Democratic government in Nigeria

The introduction of democracy as an inherent transformation from authoritarian regimes to a democratic rule constitutes democratic institutions which are formed by the people for the legitimate government to hold. However, establishing a democratic government to engage in deliberative decision is distinctive from sustainability of the democratic institutions. Thus, what is indispensable to the practice and performance of democratisation and political development in the current political system of Nigeria is sustainability of the democratic institutions which entails environmental politics as it involves planning by public agents for susceptibility by the constitutional framework. The general condition for the fledgling democracies in Africa to sustain her current democratic institutions,

particularly in Nigeria's Fourth Republic which faces complex challenge is germane to the principal's goals of democratisation.

The principal goal of democratisation focuses on democratic consolidation. Juan and Alfred (1996: 20-30) and Diamond (1997: xviii) have considered these conditions for new democratic regimes as democratising as well as political development: (a) The existence of the state is the first condition that promotes democratic consolidation. Because state is the standpoint of democracy. The people in it must highly recognise its existence for maximum loyalty. With regard to the obedience of the people to the state, Nigeria is a colonial territory with different authorities which currently exist in her political environment. (b) Democracy cannot be sought as consolidated until a democratic transition has been brought to completion. (c) No regime should be called a democracy unless their rulers govern democratically. For this condition, the freely elected executive should not infringe upon the minority rights and legitimate functions of the legislature, and thus fail to rule within the bounds of a state of law, their regimes are not democracies. (d) Periodic elections should be guaranteed. (e) Accountability and Transparency: It connotes the connectivity between the rulers and the ruled to uphold the corporate affairs of the state. Thus, democracy is based on consent of the people and must constantly remain answerable to the people who created it. Gauba (2003:425) described democracy as a political apparatus that would ensure proper accountability and transparency of the rulers and the ruled. (f) Civilian-Control of the Military: Civil-military relations are one of the prospects of democratic consolidation. The civilian government should be able to control the authority of the military in the state. Dunmoye (2008:178) noted that the civil-military relation in a democracy has to be located within this ambience. (g) Rule of Law: This point exposes the activities of the government that is in power whether it rules through the constitution or arbitrariness of self-principles. Okotie (2008:86) admitted that there is need to consider rule of law as the backbone of democracy that every member of a nation even rulers must obey the law which is the strongest prospect of democracy, where the rule of law is ignored, every facet of democratisation process becomes threatened with anarchy. (h) Huntington (1991: 270-279) proposed some conditions which influenced the first, second, and third wave consolidations which are also helpful to Nigerian democratic project. These conditions include: high level of socio-economic development, qualitative education for the populace, foreign actors influence, and the hearts of political actors and public response to solve complex problem that affect the corporate existence in a divided society in Nigeria. Apart from these conditions, he advances that truth and justice are prerequisite to smooth running of democracy and this can be achieved by adequate prosecution of the elite in power for public to believe in them. Consequently, there are no permanent conditions for consolidation of democracy but the above would be helpful to Nigeria to sustain her nascent democratic system.

In conclusion, Nigeria is the largest democracy in Africa based on the population and the socio-economic structures. Perhaps, this recognition will be utilised in the process of democratisation and political development. However, the current democratic project is susceptible to various socio-political crises which have weakened the national unity. Therefore, all hope is not lost in this struggle for sustainability because democracy involves transformation with new rules which could help to maintain the system. In this sense, the current system should reflect procedural legitimacy and triangular politics as the practice for the country with dispersed geography. First, the procedural legitimacy is limited to democratic game as the only universal principle in the leadership and competition for the power of the state to emerge. In this connection, Nigeria as a diverse territory should follow the requisite procedural rules for the management of this diversity with egalitarian means of building political institutions from the votes of the citizens which will determine the legitimacy of the government in power. On this position, procedural elections should be free and fair for the opposition parties and civil society groups to accept the outcome of the results. The *modus operandi* in procedural legitimacy is the adaptability in the population to alternate power of the state among different political parties, for example, PDP, ACN, APGA, ANPP, APGA, LP etc. This reflects democratisation and political development as the conditions for mobilization of the populace as well as political liberalization of the Fourth Republic as against dominant political party. For, example, People Democratic Party (PDP) which dominated the political environment of the country, 1999-2014. Lastly, triangular politics informs socio-political arrangement with regard to the federation of Nigeria. This ideal is produced for the people to have the spirit of nationalism as the total submission to the country's sovereignty irrespective of their affinities. The typical examples are the federation of the United States of America and Canada which sticks to democratic procedures.

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