

# A PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTION ON SUSTAINABLE POLITICS IN AFRICA: CONSTRAINTS AND POSSIBILITIES

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Available at <http://www.ssrn.com/link/OIDA-Intl-Journal-Sustainable-Dev.html>  
© Ontario International Development Agency. ISSN 1923-6654 (print) ISSN 1923-6662 (online).

**Abstract:** There are so many reasons for politics to deserve priority attention in the affairs of any nation. As the science of government, politics defines the rate and pace of development of any nation. For this reason, state managers should be able to translate political power into service-oriented enterprise. This will require providing disciplined leadership, encouraging the emergence of informed and active civil society, keeping corruption in *firm* check and guaranteeing freedom and rights of citizens to pursue their legitimate activities.

Investigations, however, reveal that the modern African government is seriously faced with the problem of corruption and leadership crisis. To say this is to underscore the questions of preparations for political office, perception, social grounding, political priorities, expectations and strategies expected of African leaders. The need to evaluate the place of the individual in governance is critical when one reflects on the role an individual can play in the (mis)creation of ideology and nation building. Mandela's integrated approach and Robert Mugabe's zero sum politics are good instances of far-reaching effect of how an individual's value and behavior can shape national and international politics.

Yet, it is imperative that for politics to succeed and endure, political concerns should be placed on a structural frame outside the reach of power holders. If this is the case, why are African states still struggling with leadership crisis when these states have constitution clearly spelling out the dos and don'ts of office holders? While this question springs from politics, its resolution lies outside of it. It requires sustained reflection to grapple with the nuances posed by constraints in achieving this goal and the possibilities of its realization. A philosophical reflection, then, provides the platform to adequately interrogate the problems preventing the emergence of clean politics in Africa as well as point up road map for its actualization and sustenance.

The paper will tease out obstacles that obstruct the emergence of clean politics that existing views failed to mention. Also the paper will cut through layers of accepted understanding of the character of African politics and provide new and challenging insights into the power game in African politics. In addition, the paper will further a better understanding of the categories of social order in the makeup of African politics and provoke interest in the activities of leaders and followers. In a globally interconnected world an adequate understanding of the political affairs of Africa has great impact in strengthening or weakening mutual relationship with other nations.

**Keywords:** Africa, government, Leadership, Philosophy, Politics

## Introduction

Interest on Africa's destiny tends to revolve around one core issue: politics. Other issues such as the economy, human rights, religious tolerance, poverty alleviation, employment opportunities, press freedom, security tend to be better handled or mismanaged based on the political climate in place. As such the parameters are well defined: How can enduring political structures be crafted and maintained in Africa to act as a frame for the activities of other sectors.

The solution is not clear cut. Africa's political landscape is determined by a confluence of forces that impose constraints as well as create possibilities for sustainable politics in Africa. The paper offers a philosophical reflection on the problem by situating the constraints and possibilities within a dualistic ambit. The main aim of such a methodological departure is to capture both the substance and nuances of the two and their overlaps. The result will help to guide understanding towards a more authentic portrayal of the complexity of African political challenges.

### Setting the context

In a paradoxical sense, to move forward is also to look back. It is important to build details from the scratch. Setting a contextual framework helps to understand properly why things are they way they are as a necessary prelude to working out what should be. For Said (1994:133) 'ideas, cultures and histories cannot seriously be understood or studied without their force, or more precisely their configurations of power, also being studied'. The conventional knowledge about the need to understand society in order to change it, according to Ake (1981: vii) 'should be taken more seriously'. For an adequate understanding of a subject the history, because it highlights the formation and outlines the significant issues emanating from the existence, is important. Ake (vii) insists that 'we do not really understand a society until we can account for how it came to be what it is, until we can articulate its laws of motion'. The essence is to locate where for Achebe (2006:1) the rain began to beat us. Knowledge of this will help to determine how to set up an adequate refuge and work out a comprehensive maintenance plan.

There is a sense in which the account of modern Africa begins with independence from colonialism.<sup>1</sup> The colonialist set up and controlled the institutions responsible for ideological production – schools, media, courts, churches, police, military and also material production – corporations, factories and enterprises. The colonial administrator recruited government officials, stipulated general policy goals, set up policy options, pointed out priority directions, chose the final alternative, guided policy implementation, and fostered two dominate ideologies – ethnocentrism for Europe and xenocentrism for Africa. All this converged to give colonial rule a kind of *meta*-power. As far as colonial rule is concern Ake (1989:51) is of the opinion that 'politics was a power struggle unmediated by legitimacy norms, it never raised the issue of good government, only the issue of the locus of power'. The colonial administration executed 'activities that it deemed appropriate without widespread consultation and without questioning its superior knowledge' (Chazan, Mortimer, Rothchild and Stedman, 1999:43). As such the 'power of the colonial state was not only absolute but arbitrary' (Ake 2001:2) and the relationship between occident and orient is characterized by power domination and varying degrees of complex hegemony (Said 133). In such a power playing field, middle range values such as consultation, tolerance, compromise, moderation, mutual respect, dialogue were completely excluded.

For everyone in this political arena, Ake (2001:3) insists that 'security lay only in the accumulation of power' or finding ways to attach oneself to the powerful.

The above provide an insight into the preparations for political office by African leaders and the political structure they inherited at independence. 'As Germany, Belgium, France, Britain, Portugal pulled out of Africa they left behind them a system of government based on elitism, patronage and power – fertile ground for the seeds of corruption' (Nutt 2005). This explains the predisposition of African rulers to 'strive to retain power as long as possible and to use it to advance their own material interests' (Nzongola-Ntalaja 1987:83). Nzongola-Ntalaja (87) maintains that 'for most high level officials, the state is a structure of control to be used for the pursuit of private interests. The most important of these is personal enrichment'. In Ake's (2001:7) view 'for anyone who was part of the ruling faction, entrepreneurial activity was unnecessary, for one could appropriate surplus with less risk and less trouble by means of state power'. The result is 'a fractional politics calculated to prevent nation-building' (Okigbo 1991: 424) and very *fragile* leaders most unprepared for the management of a modern state (Austin 1980; Boahen 1991; Okigbo 1991; Ake 2001). The region between exercise of political power and lack of control is corruption.

Corruption is, in fact, one of the greatest challenges facing Africa. In Nigeria, for instance, it is estimated that more than \$400 billion was stolen from the treasury by Nigeria's leaders between 1960 and 1999. Speaking to *New African* (2012:29) on removal of Nigeria's fuel subsidy which the government claimed would yield \$8bn Achebe notes that 'the scale of corruption in ... the Nigerian government ... amounts to at least \$10bn a year'. African leadership prize created in 2007 by Sudan-born billionaire Mo Ibrahim to encourage excellence in leadership in the continent has been awarded only three times in 2007, 2008 and 2011.

Also the contradictory dogma that colonial masters imparted on their African associates – that, on the one hand, they are not mentally equipped to handle sophisticated issues of governance and, on the other hand, that their association with Europe set them apart and made them better than their people – has become the building block for politics in Africa. This strange mesh of superiority and inferiority complex – superiority in relation to their citizens and inferiority in relation to international relations – has continued

to have a profound impact on the actions of African leaders.

### **Sustainable Politics: Constraints and Possibilities**

Studies have shown that matters of leadership pose a key challenge for development (Kaufmann and Dininio 2006; Lederman, Loayza and Soares 2006). In a globally interconnected world, Africa needs to aim for sustainable politics as development is a decisive index in nation assessment. The achievement of sustainable politics, however, has two major aspects: constraints and possibilities. Constraints are the factors, concrete and elusive, that thwart its realization; possibilities are actions that must be put in place to achieve its success. Many points can be identified for each, but I choose a dualistic approach that highlights each as the flip side of the other. The logic that informs this method is that constraint identified and righted becomes a possibility created and achieved.

### **Deficit Leadership versus Followership**

Historical investigations reveal that the 'modern' African government has retained the monolithic character of its colonial forebear. To say this is, however, to underscore the questions of preparations for political office, perception, social grounding, political priorities and expectations of an African leader. The need to evaluate the place of the individual in governance is critical when we reflect on the role an individual can play in the (dis)creation of ideology and nation building. Gandhi's tactics of nonviolent resistance, Karl Marx's economic determinism, Adolf Hitler's total war obsession, Mandela's united we can move forward and Robert Mugabe's zero sum politics are good instances of far-reaching effect of how an individual's value and behaviour can shape national and international politics. Achebe (1983:17) maintains that Nigeria's leadership crisis can be solved by 'one shining act of bold selfless leadership at the top, such as unambiguous refusal to be corrupt or tolerate corruption at the fountain of authority will radiate powerful sensations of well-being and pride through every nerve and artery of national life'. Studies, in fact, suggest that the first area to tackle in ensuring that Africa embarks on a comprehensive long-term recovery is governance and leadership (Achebe 1983; Ake 1989, 1994, 1996, 2001; World Bank 2000; Stapenhurst, Johnston, and Pelizzo 2006). Pope Benedict XVI during a week-long tour of African countries (Cameroon and Angola) in March 2009 stated that one principle that is indispensable to any modern democracy which Africa needs to imbibe in

order to move the continent forward is transparent governance.

Yet the 'deep-seated structural conditions' (Clapham 1985:53) inherited from colonialism cannot be altered by only good leaders. In recognition that 'all long-term politics are institutional' (Popper 1962:126) there is the need to locate the crisis of leadership within the broader ambit of the crisis of followership for leaders to succeed and enduring structures to be put in place and be effective. It is utopian to assume that leaders (and this is not just about Africa) must or even should be above board. There are always temptations as such leaders need moral guards. There is, however, dearth of critical mass of human capital required to *rehabilitate* leaders (whose dominate notion of politics is as a zero-sum game) and turn them into responsible, responsive, accountable and transparent leaders.

Some reasons can be adduced for this deficiency. The most devastating is legislative complicity. In Nigeria, for instance, the perception is that parliamentarians use their oversight functions to enrich themselves instead of monitoring governance. *Punch* newspaper editorial of April 25, 2014 notes that '[m]aking laws that can move Nigeria forward has never been a strong point with our lawmakers. Instead, our National Assembly members live in opulence at the expense of the majority of Nigerians (20)'. Agbo (2012: 47) reporting for *Tell* magazine states that '[s]ome ministers, directors general of departments and agencies and chief executives of companies whose establishments had come under public scrutiny allege intimidation and extortion from the lawmakers'. The problem is such that committees are fragmented to accommodate powerful interests as 'a senate president or speaker who ignores this in the composition of committees will likely not last long as a principal officer'. In the case of state legislators, the governor determines how far their oversight function can go. Commenting on the oversight side of their constitutional function a lawmaker from Enugu state told *Tell* (51) 'How do you even think of it?...You try it and your political career is over! The governor will descend on you with a sledge hammer'.

The problem is made worse by ex-parliamentarians becoming governors and ex-governors using the legislative arm as their fall-back cushion. In Nigeria former governors of Kaduna state, Ahmed Makarfi; Yobe, Bukar Abba Ibrahim; Kwara, Bukola Saraki; Gombe, Abubakar Goje; Nasarawa, Abdulahi Adamu and more have retired to the senate. Serving senators

and House of Representative members such as Deputy speaker Emeka Ihedioha, senators Enyinnaya Abaribe, Nkechi Nwogu, Ifeanyi Okowa are alleged to be getting ready for the governorship contest of their various states in 2015. Such criss-crossing ordinarily may not be bad in itself given the experience such people ought to have garnered. But in cases where the leaders performed below average in their previous task, such recycling becomes a heavy liability on the society. Also given their status, the presence of ex-governors in senate inevitably creates unnecessary tension for the leadership. Again given that these ex-governors still have their friends in office, in a case of misdemeanour the fate of a governor may well lie on the strength or weakness of his friends within the parliament. Such a situation seriously compromises the essence of parliamentary existence. Instead of acting as the solution – in terms of enacting and protecting laws that guarantee integrity in governance – parliament ends as the chief problem.

On the part of citizens, the percentage of people living in extreme poverty is concentrated in Africa (World Bank 2000, 2005; Kopoka 2001; Cheru 2008; Bigsten and Durevall 2008). In a speech he made at Council on Foreign Relations in Washington on April 1, 2014, the World Bank Group President, Jim Yong Kim confirmed this. He stated that two-thirds of the world's extreme poor are concentrated in just five countries. Two African countries, Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of Congo were included in the list. He also noted that five more countries can be added to the list. Again three African countries – Tanzania, Ethiopia and Kenya – made the list. Poverty is linked to the inability to attain a minimum standard of living, 'a lack of decision-making' and 'acute exploitation and powerlessness of the individual, of groups within a country and of nations' (Kopoka 151). Common characteristics of poverty include illiteracy, high levels of malnutrition, poor sanitation, limited participation in socio-economic activities, susceptibility to illness and corruption. Poverty, generally, affects the ability to reason *effectively* which is needed to shun an enticing vice such as corruption. By effective reasoning I refer to the capacity to be able to adequately understand issues and be in a position to exercise independent judgement. This entails both the possession and execution of intellectual power. Marx argued that man has to satisfy his economic need before he can think. Poverty is, above all, disenfranchisement from power games. This powerlessness triggers a chain

reaction, a grotesque representation of a fruitful enterprise.<sup>2</sup>

First, poverty makes it easy for poor people to be corrupted. It is this openness to corruption that paradoxically enhances their leaders' corruption. The poor 'whose focus understandably is on survival' (Schaefer and Lamm 1997:314) are more likely, for instance, to accept money to vote for a (usually an incompetent) candidate during election. It will be wrong to look at this as an African problem. It is a human response in the face of severe disadvantage and suffering. When the children of Israel faced severe hunger in their march towards *liberation* they accused their leader of bringing them out of the land of their *oppression* where they at least had something to eat. It took the deliverance of manner from *Heaven* to keep them committed to their goal.

Second, the focus on basic survival critically undermines political participation. Where there is apathy to political affairs institutions of government will operate with less sense of accountability to society. The point is that poverty *holes* up its victims. The world of the poor is a universe of liabilities and limitations that severely curtails any involvement in politics. To hold a government to account, for instance, 'you need to be able to read, to understand and to challenge your representatives' (Nutt 2005). It is difficult to see how poor people can effectively be turned into 'an organized citizenry ready to monitor the political process and the conduct of public officials' (Diamond 1983:100) which is a major requirement in ensuring accountability and curbing corruption in public office. It has been noted that 'the incentive to corrupt whatever official purposes public institutions are agreed to have is especially great in conditions of extreme inequality and considerable absolute poverty' (Leys 1965:225).

More importantly, the poor aside, there is a general apathy by citizens towards government affairs. A possible explanation is that 'people see the state as an alien force' and as such 'they make no commitment to its policies, rather they seek to exploit them to their own advantage, to evade them or to subvert them' (Ake, 1989:47). For instance, 'in Nigeria the government was "they". It had nothing to do with you or me. It was an alien institution and people's business was to get as much from it as they could without getting into trouble' (Achebe 1960:29-30). Such conception and attitude towards public office holders invariably fuels and conceals corruption. Citizens' disinterestedness in government affairs do not prevent them from being favourably disposed to

corruption on a dual front – both for themselves and the leaders. This acceptance denies them the chance to hold the leaders accountable. Kolapo is of the persuasion that ‘if we cannot conceive of an effective, proactive, democratic, and empowered followership as the appropriate structural and cultural contexts within which an effective democratic leadership could emerge, it might be difficult to make significant progress in Nigeria, and Africa in general’. Effective leadership necessarily implies effective citizenship united in a collective goal attainment.

As such for a leader to provide the right kind of leadership to his/her society, first the society has to nurture and groom the leader well. Three things are imperative in this regard. The society will have a zero tolerance to corruption. The society will prevent the erosion of its good culture and values while at the same time creating space for africanization of good global practices. The society will adhere to the principle and policy of meritocracy.

#### **Persistence of set**

Persistence of set here is an attitude of sticking to an old order even when the situation has changed and more dynamic responses and methods are required. With independence the composition of public officials changed. It became government of Africa by Africans. It was expected that the authoritarian character of colonial rule would be dismantled in favour of a more citizen friendly administration. Instead Betty Muragori tells Mutch (2012:38) of *New African* that ‘in Kenya, the new leaders didn’t really overturn the colonial model. They stepped into the trappings of privilege, and carried on. We live in comfortable suburbs. Yet we have terrible slums on our doorstep. It’s about comfort and exclusion, did we really dismantle it?’ Nzongola-Ntalaja (73) notes that most post-colonial African leaders ‘were more interested in replacing Europeans in the leading positions of power and privilege than in effecting a radical transformation of the state and society around it’. The form and function of the state ‘did not change much for most countries in Africa. State power remained essentially the same: immense, arbitrary, often violent, always threatening’ (Ake 2001:6). Government programmes remained unclear, unstable and arbitrary. There is no *real* due process – legal protection against arbitrary administrative actions (unwarranted detentions, forced confessions), unfair trial procedures, and confusing, all-encompassing laws that give extensive discretion to government officials. Even the attempt at democracy

is a cover to hide many interpretations which has nothing to do with voters’ right to choose key decision makers in competitive, free, and honest elections.

In its editorial of March 2, 2014, *Sunday Punch* (16) observes that ‘shortly after independence in 1960, Nigeria entered into a vicious circle of election rigging, ballot box stuffing, and falsification of results’. It went further to note that ‘Nigeria is still reeling from the effects of the scandalous fraud that marked the 2007 elections. With the connivance of electoral officials, results were falsified in many states’. In a keynote speech delivered by Soyinka at an economic summit organized by the BRACED Commission<sup>3</sup> in April 2012, Obayiuwana (2012:32) quotes Soyinka as stating that ‘there is ...the affliction of [political] illegitimacy – the dubious legitimacy of a large percentage of representatives of the peoples supposed political will at the centre, at the federal and national assemblies and even in the lodges of executive governors’. Soyinka went further to assert that ‘[e]ven in a 75% “perfect” election, properly conducted, a vast number of the present “honourables”, senators and governors, could never have caught the sheerest whiff of the wood varnish on the seats they now occupy’. Commenting on the 2011 elections, El-Rufai (2013:466) stated that a leading PDP apparatchik from Kaduna state confessed to him that PDP added about 800,000 votes to Jonathan’s real votes so that he could get at least 25% of the total votes cast in Kaduna. According to his informant this was done ‘because VP Namadi Sambo was determined not to be disgraced in his home state’.

What obtains in reality is *authoritarian* democracy – a situation where in theory citizens are free to participate in political affairs, whereas in practice that participation is severely curtailed or outrightly denied. Nigeria experience aside, the December 27, 2007 presidential election in Kenya; March 29, 2008 presidential election in Zimbabwe and the August 30, 2009 presidential election in Gabon are also good instances. The legal mechanisms set up for opposing government or for removing a leader from power exists mostly as a nomenclature – a word game devoid of content. Even in cases of litigation the usurpers use the power of their illegitimate office and public funds to prosecute the lawsuits instituted against them by their opponents. The old status quo under colonial regime has persisted. The leaders still operate from ‘a sense of superiority over those whom they ruled, a sense of power emanating from above, rather than growing from below,’ while ‘for the ruled,

a sense of the state as an alien imposition to be accepted, certainly, and to be feared, cajoled and where possible exploited, but existing on a plane above the people whom it governed and beyond any chance of control' (Clapham 19). Indeed 'as an authoritarian structure of control preoccupied with the political survival and the material interests of the ruling class, the post-colonial state is not radically different from its predecessor, the colonial state' (Nzongola-Ntalaja 84).

This, however, is where the fault line lies. Old African societies differ significantly from western societies. Nigeria, for instance, is made up of people with strong differing political orientations and culture bunched up and administered as a country. In an interview, Nigeria's legal icon, Ben Nwabueze, told *Sunday Vanguard*, March 30, 2014 (43) that 'Nigeria is not one nation...we have in Nigeria over 350 nations, and the problem is to coalesce them into one'. Commenting on the crisis ignited by the removal of fuel subsidy by President Goodluck Jonathan's government on January 1<sup>st</sup>, 2012, Achebe told *New African* (2012:29) that 'the great challenge for Nigeria – one that has stunted its development since independence – is how to convince 150 million people to put aside competing interests, sideline different religions, ethnicities, political persuasions, and build a united rostrum or two with strong leaders to truly bring about fundamental change to the country'. Nothing, perhaps, captures this as the drastic increase in the insurgence of Boko Haram in Nigeria since Jonathan assumed office, in his own right, as the president of Nigeria in 2011. Its Moslem affiliation and Northern-Nigeria base is seen as Northern-Moslem effort to create insecurity in the country and destabilize Jonathan's government. Indeed Nwabueze told *Sunday Vanguard* (44) that he believes that 'Boko Haram is a subject of politics. Some northern political and religious leaders are definitely behind it'. The ascension of Jonathan, a Christian Southern Nigerian, following the death of Yar'Adua, a Moslem Northern Nigerian, to the office of the president unleashed political tension in Nigeria. Popular thinking is that ex-president Obasanjo, who handpicked his successor Yar'Adua and paired him with Jonathan and guaranteed their success in the 2007 election, was very mindful of Yar'Adua's state of health. In years to come historians may better appreciate Obasanjo's role in re-strategizing power balance in Nigeria between the North and the South; Moslems and Christians.

In explaining the Tanzania situation, Nyerere (1998:77) informs that:

*'Our Africa was a poor country before it was invaded and ruled by foreigners. There were no rich people in Africa. There was no person or group of persons who had exclusive claim to the ownership of the land. Land was the property of all the people and those who used it did not do so because it was their property. They used it because they needed it, and it was their responsibility to use it carefully and hand it over in good condition for use of future generations.'*

It is utopia to suppose that the past Nyerere eulogized can be recaptured. It is, however, important that the spirit of its central messages be carefully considered and as far as it is feasible incorporated into African political life. The messages are: first, that African political system was structured in such a way that it was impossible for anyone to appropriate more than the person had actual need for. The second one is that there were strong cultural institutions and effective system to guide and guard individual conducts so that one was always mindful of the way his/her actions impact on societal well-being.

As such the priority direction of African leaders at independence should have centered on two major concerns. One, people who had been hitherto alienated from government concerns should have been co-opted back into the fold in order to build up a strong nation. Two, western-style governance should have been interrogated and re-interpreted and relevant aspects adapted to African experience. This is still what largely needs to be done. Ultimately Africa needs to consciously develop its own political philosophy tailored along its enduring cultural values.

### **Neo-Protectors versus Justice and Peace**

In the colonial language the colonized is a 'weakling' who 'requires protection,' hence the 'concept of a protectorate' for 'it is in the colonizer's own interest that he be excluded from management functions, and that those heavy responsibilities be reserved for the colonizer' (Memmi 1981:181). This line of thinking is clearly decipherable in the attitude of African *neo-protectors* – African leaders who believe that they are the only ones who can govern (misrule?) their people. To cite Mbembe (1992:7) in Togo 'state power was embodied in a single person, the president. He alone controlled the law and could on his own, grant or abolish liberties'. It took death, the almighty final

solution, to extricate Gabon in June 2009 from the grip of Omar Bongo after 41 years before being forced back into the clutches of his son in September 2009. In spite of the violent protests that followed the election and the court challenges by opposition candidates, Ali Bongo has retained the office. Mugabe, president of Zimbabwe since 1980 refused to relinquish power in 2008 after he failed the election preferring instead to preside over a ruined state than to see his *beloved* country in the hands of someone else. Many people were killed, several women raped, thousands were displaced, inflation rate soared to 231 million percent, cholera epidemic claimed over 4000 lives, unemployment rate climbed to nearly 90% and the living condition of most Zimbabwe's 12 million people reduced to dire and worsening poverty. It was estimated that at least 8.3 billion dollars was needed to revive the Zimbabwean economy that was once the second-largest economy in Southern Africa. According to the 2009 Ibrahim Index of Governance published by the Mo Ibrahim Foundation in October 2009 Zimbabwe ranked 51<sup>st</sup> out of all the 53 countries. Penketh and Hughes (2008) quote Mandela as describing the Zimbabwean crisis as 'tragic failure of leadership'. An election-related civil war nearly happened in Senegal when President Abdoulaye Wade wanted to run for a third term in 2012 after 12 years in power. The former UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, on a visit to Nigeria in March 2009 accused many African presidents of running anti-democratic regimes. He described the attitude of many African leaders who act as if only they can be trusted to run their country as a matter of 'profound shame' and observed that in many African countries human rights and the rule of law were disregarded. Mandela and Pope Benedict XVI legacies are worth noting. Mandela won the first multiracial elections in South Africa in 1994 and served a single term. On February 11, 2013 Pope Benedict XVI announced that due to his failing physical health he no longer considers himself suited to an adequate exercise of his office. Their action demonstrate an important teaching: leadership is not about the office holder but about the ability of the office holder to *effectively* translate the demands of the office. By holding on to power African leaders forsake their role as elder statesmen thus denying their respective countries and the continent of their wealth of experience.

This constraint is further compounded as measures to correct it are often located at the interface between justice and peace. There is always a calculation between the price of punishing corrupt leaders and

maintaining national peace. In *Legacies of Power*, Southhall, Simutanyi and Daniel (2006:18) state that 'Moi's conditional immunity is illustrative of transitions to democracy in which the demands of justice have been bargained away in return for peace and stability'. The same assumptions can safely be made of the unity government between Mugabe and Tsvangarai that helped to secure uneasy peace in Zimbabwe. Such calculations might have been a factor in foot dragging attitude of the Kibaki government to establish a special tribunal to try 2008 Kenya post election violence masterminds in compliance with the ICC directive. Waugh (2012:23) reminds us that recourse to the ICC may be at express odds with national legislation as in the case of Mozambique. Following the Rome Accords in 1992, which ended Mozambique's 15-year conflict, 'the national parliament granted general unconditional amnesty to perpetrators of war crimes from all parties'.

Liberia's Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) final report released in 2009 recommended 120 people for prosecution for war crimes and crimes against humanity. It also recommended that 49 people should be barred from political office for 30 years because of their alleged involvement with warring factions. President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf was among those barred for her support of Taylor in the early stage of the war. The report was not implemented. MacDougall (2012:21) reports that many analysts argue that 'the indictment of powerful members of the political establishment has been the main reason why the report appears to have been shelved and its more punitive recommendations ignored'. The executive and legislature branches of Liberia's government contain many ex-warlords like Prince Johnson. Commenting on Johnson's case, MacDougall quotes Noble Peace Prize laureate, Leymah Gbowee as saying, '[i]f you decide to indict Johnson and use the retributive kind of justice for prosecution, especially in Liberia, you need to think about how you will quell some of the riots and demonstrations that will come as a result of this.' She went further to state, 'the question is should we allow him to go free because of fear of that? The answer is no...But the other question is when? Not now. We still see people being prosecuted for crimes they committed in World War II today'. Adolf Eichmann's case particularly imbues this view point with hope.

Yet, such optimism sidelines a cardinal consideration. Justice delayed in some cases may well be justice denied. How is the 30years moratorium on political

office going to *significantly* affect President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, for instance, when she, most probably, would have completed two terms in office? South Africa's president, Jacob Zuma, proposed in 2009 that autocratic African leaders step down in return for immunity on prosecution. Alluring as this position may be, it completely compromises the demands of justice. How can society consistently and continuously channel effort towards ensuring that every of its member is accorded his/her due if a person do not receive the appropriate punishment or reward for his/her crime or services? Rawls (1971) identifies justice as the first virtue of social institutions and insists that laws and institutions must be reformed or abolished, however efficient and well-managed they are, if they are unjust. Besides, justice ought to promote peace. Mindful of reality, however, that often the price of peace is to forsake justice, there is need for a balance between allowing corrupt politicians to go scout free in order to avoid political instability and discouraging upcoming politicians from becoming corrupt. Peace without justice will invariably create discontentment among the citizens, frustrate collaboration of peoples toward common objectives, polarize political office holders and establish a climate of insecurity.

### Leadership by proxy

A common feature of African politics is for rulers who eventually agree to quit office or to 'step aside' (in the language of one of Nigeria's ex-president, Babangida) to plant a successor who will continue to be loyal to them. When this is not the case, leaders who win (rigged) election usually have a grandmaster or a consortium of grandmasters behind the scene calling the shots. According to Ake (2001:14) 'the state in Africa has been a maze of antinomies of form and content. The person who holds office may not exercise its powers, the person who exercises the powers of a given office may not be its holder, informal relations often override formal relations, the formal hierarchies of bureaucratic structure and political power are not always the clue to decision making power'. The late Adedibu and Oyo state politics in Nigeria is a good instance. This is no different from the colonial administrator who is 'very rarely concerned with values' because 'he is in any case the instrument of a policy that has been decided elsewhere' (Abrahams 1955:388). The colonial administrator in Achebe's *Arrow of god* (1964:56) laments that 'the great tragedy of British colonial administration was that the man on the spot who knew his African and knew what he was talking about found himself constantly overruled by starry-

eyed fellows at headquarters'. In the same manner the leaders who are 'on the spot' find it difficult to deliver on their election promises because they are saddled with directives from their masters and serving their interests. This affects their ability to provide policy direction, maintain a principled point of view and, more importantly, it undermines their ability to address issues of social concern. Former Anambra state governor, in Nigeria, Chinwoke Mbadinuju (1999 – 2003) told *Saturday Punch* of December 21, 2013 that part of the reason why he was unable to deliver on his election promises was because he was made to pay a godfather who had an arrangement with the military that he would be paid 10million naira every month. Nzungola-Ntalaja (73) notes that 'the social question is at the very centre of the present crisis of the state throughout the African continent'. This is because 'it involves the state's capacity for economic and social development, or its ability to raise the standard of living of the population'. It should be noted that this attempt to corner state power directly or indirectly has to do with the 'attractive' nature of the state as the central control of power and invariably wealth of the nation.

Fortunately, once in while there is a backlash as in the case of Chiluba of Zambia and his hand picked successor, the late Manawasa. In Nigeria, the political friction between ex-president Obasanjo and his political God-son President Jonathan is largely interpreted as Jonathan's ability to distance himself from Obasanjo. Such gut is important. Leadership is characteristically a sphere that calls for courage, commitment and responsibility and it is a serious fault not to be able to demonstrate these.

### Prioritization of politics over development

The development of a country should be the prime aim for aspiring to a political office. To say this is to underscore the role of political leaders in establishing level playing field for the economy to thrive, guaranteeing rule of law, human rights, accountability, religious tolerance, poverty alleviation, press freedom, employment, basic infrastructure such as electricity, water and ensuring security of life and property. Locke (1946) insists that the state came into existence as a practical necessity and the chief aim of government is to safeguard property right. West (1980:80) reminds us of Bell's assertion concerning the crucial importance of leadership in any society. Bell asserts: 'One wants men in office, who can govern well. The quality of life in any society is determined in considerable measure, by the quality of leadership. A society that



does not have its best men at the head of its leading institutions is a sociological and moral absurdity’.

As such development suffers when leaders prioritize politics over citizens’ welfare. The state pardon granted of former Governor of Bayelsa state, Diepreye Alamieyeseigha, who was convicted in 2008 for stealing more than \$10million in state funds by president Jonathan is a tacit endorsement of placing politics over development. Even though the presidency denies that the pardon was politically driven, the close association between Jonathan and Alamieyeseigha cast serious doubt on the presidential claim. Jonathan was Alamieyeseigha’s deputy governor from 1999 to 2005 before the latter was impeached and Jonathan became governor. More importantly is the message the pardon sends. So long as you have a strong person in government you can commit any crime, even if you serve time for it, you will eventually receive a clean slate to go on with your political life.

Political interest was paramount during late president Yar’Adua’s protracted illness. Cabal close to him hijacked the country, kept details of his illness from the public, and ensured that the vice president, Jonathan, did not become acting president. From 23 November 2009 when Yar’Adua left the country without handing over to Jonathan and 9 February 2010 there was power vacuum. Nigeria was saved from the brink of political crisis by an unprecedented ‘doctrine of necessity’ invoked by the National Assembly to install Jonathan as the acting president. President Abdoulaye Wade’s third term failure in 2012 nearly plunged Senegal into a political crisis. Meanwhile Bojang (2012:23) reports that his inability to clinch the third term bid had to do with ‘growing disillusionment over his economic policies, failure to curb corruption, and ...the power of his son, Karim, in the government’.

The National conference inaugurated by President Jonathan on March 17, 2014 is seen by many critics as being politically motivated. Nwakanma (2014:9) notes that the terms of the conference are not the terms of the Nigerian nation, ‘it is the terms set down by the president of the federation for a body of people he has selected to discuss certain aspects of the National question that his office has determined to be important to the president’s agenda’. Instead of a proper national conference backed by an act of parliament that has the capacity to draft a constitution that can be submitted to the people for approval through a referendum, the president went for a conference where he can set the agenda. Ben

Nwabueze in an interview he granted *Sunday Vanguard* on March 30, 2014 accused the government of deliberately setting a conference that sidelines the most crucial issue – the power to adopt a new constitution for Nigeria – and looking for a pliable chairman who would go along with it. Nwakanma (9) described the conferees as ‘products of smoky backroom politics rather than clear citizen mandate’. His no-go area which concerns the unity of Nigeria is, however, one area which Nigerians seriously need to talk about. Such limiting scope means that the conference cannot address the terms for Nigeria’s continued existence. It is utopia to suppose that because Nigeria has survived the first 100 years of British amalgamation it will continue to go on. Internal crisis within the country suggest that there is need to re-interrogate the terms of the current unity and re-define its future terms. Nwabueze believes that this can be achieved through ‘a new beginning under a new constitution anchored on the people’.

The former governor of Delta state, Nigeria, from 1999 – 2007, James Onanefe Ibori was freed of over 150 criminal charges for fraud, money laundering and theft of public funds in a Federal High Court in Asaba due to his alleged powerful influence over the government of late president Umaru Yar’Adua. It took London’s Southwark Crown Court to sentence Ibori to 13years imprisonment on 17 April 2012 after admitting to 10 counts of conspiracy to defraud and money laundering. Judge Anthony Pitts while sentencing him observed that from the modest way Ibori lived in London in the 1990s no one would have imagined the multi-millionaire high profile governor he would become in a space of eight or nine years. Obayiwana (2012:34) reports that from the proceeds of stolen/laundered money, Ibori allegedly bought a house in Hampstead, north London; a property in Shaftesbury, Dorset; a mansion in Sandton, near Johannesburg, South Africa; a fleet of armoured Range Rovers; a Bentley, and a Mercedes Maybach.

It will, however, be superficial to look at this from the simple motive of wealth acquisition. It hides a more fundamental and foundational crisis. Fundamentally, it is a psychological aspiration (delusion?) to fuse power and money and create an *untouchable* ego. This ambition in itself is a statement of insecurity and fear possibly borne of the awareness that ‘power, and especially state power, is a zero-sum game, as being in or out has serious consequences for one’s well-being as well as life itself’ (Nzongola-Ntalaja 84). Gandhi effectively demonstrated that the only thing that can be

possessed at all is non-possession. Foundationally, it speaks of the type of political socialization<sup>4</sup> received by African leaders and their preparedness for their job. Politics is often seen as the only avenue for massive wealth acquisition.

There is need to create an office within the AU to complement existing efforts of individual countries electoral commission. The office should have the responsibility of ensuring that any high political office seeker in Africa is not harbouring an international criminal record. A case like Ibori's, who was convicted on two occasions in UK courts but failed to declare his criminal convictions while filling out his electoral forms, would have been prevented. It is important to anticipate situations, put proactive measures in place to forestall and frustrate the emergence of corrupt people on African political space.

#### Leadership and moral deficit

In the *Republic* Plato (1941) assigned the role of leadership to the philosopher-king who through intensive education is able to reach the vision of the Good and is ready to direct the affairs of the state. The knowledge of the Good constitutes for Plato the ultimate goal, 'for the saviour of society the one thing needful is a certain and immediate knowledge of values, the ends which all life, private or public, should realize' (211). The Good, in main, then, has to do with the ability to provide moral direction – how we are to live. In the case of a leader who has to provide the moral compass what does he/she ought and ought not to do? How does his/her acts, commission and omission, affect the society? In the case of a serious dichotomy, where a leader's action is *significantly* opposed to his words which should people pay more attention to?

Ex-president Obasanjo's 18-page letter to president Jonathan on December 2, 2013 titled 'Before it is too late' captures the core of this dilemma. Among the many advice Obasanjo gave to Jonathan about how to 'make Nigeria great' he reminded Jonathan that '[a]s a leader, two things you must cherish and hold dear among others are trust and honour both of which are important ingredients of character'. Obasanjo made it known that he 'will want to see anyone in the office of the presidency of Nigeria as a man or woman who can be trusted, a person of honour in his words and character'.

Political commentators on Nigeria's political affairs, however, condemned Obasanjo's letter and denounced him as a hypocrite. In *Tell* (2014) cover

story 'The many faces of Obasanjo' anchored by Raymond Mordi, Debo Adeniran who heads the Coalition Against Corrupt Leaders, notes that Obasanjo's letter exposes how dishonest he is 'as a former leader of the country, because he has no modicum of integrity to accuse the present administration when he even did worse in his own administration' (19). Bamidele Ademola-Olateju blames Obasanjo for the crisis in the country by engineering the emergence of his successor with the hope that Yar'Adua would eventually die and Jonathan would take over and be taking instructions from him. This strategic calculation, however, failed to 'factor in the intoxicating nature of power, influence of free money on the militants and their sponsors, interest of oil thieves and foreign dealers of arms supplying the militants' (18). Ademola-Olateju was also of the opinion that it was Obasanjo's third term agenda that set Nigeria on the road to 'perdition'. For Dele Seteolu, who worked for Obasanjo as a speechwriter in the Africa Leadership Forum in the early 90s, 'Obasanjo has no interest in Nigerians'. He sees Obasanjo as 'representing a political class that is self-serving, a political class that is conscious of its class position and would always want to protect and sustain its class interest' (18). Obasanjo's ascension to power in 1999 is seen as the manipulation of the military who wanted to ensure that the transition to democracy remains only a poly. In his article in *Sunday Vanguard* of December 15, 2013 Nwakanma (59) states that the Generals 'took Obasanjo from jail and made him president' because 'they needed to protect their already entrenched interests'. Mbadinuju also told *Saturday Punch* of December 21, 2013 that when he tried to stop the 10million naira monthly payment arrangement that the military had with a godfather, Obasanjo compelled him to continue with the payment.

Jonathan in his December 20, 2013 reply to Obasanjo reminded him that the renowned afro-beat maestro, Fela Anikulapo-Kuti who was also Obasanjo's kinsman sang about corruption during Obasanjo's first stint as Head of State. Obasanjo's daughter, Iyabo (2013), in her open letter to Obasanjo called him a liar, manipulator and hypocrite. Mordi, however, notes that some observers have imputed political motive to Iyabo's vituperation. For these observers Iyabo's letter is not 100 per cent ethical. They see it as her way of venting her frustration on her father for failing to support her bid to return to the senate. The truth may lie somewhere in the beginning, middle or even in the end. The wisdom in

a Chinese proverb: if you believe everything you read, you better not read at all, is important here.

In his book *The Tragedy of Victory*, Alabi-Isama (2013) dismissed the claims Obasanjo made in his book *My Command* as inconsistent with the truth. He sees Obasanjo as a person who reaps where he did not sow. The book *My Command* is summed up as 'all fictionalised history' (652). Soyinka (2006:133) also summarized Obasanjo's *My Command* as made up of 'many half-truths, outright lies and coy adumbrations.' He remarks that in the view of Obasanjo's own officers 'Obasanjo could not be trusted' (138).

Such tension between leadership and moral deficit as encapsulated in the foregoing exerts huge psychological stress on society. Should Obasanjo's advice be dismissed based on the discrepancy between the channel and the message? Does a message have a worth that is completely independent of the channel? Are there instances where the channel is as important (or even more) as the message? How does this affect the receiver? That these questions should be asked reflect the central role a leader plays in influencing the thoughts, opinions and actions of his/her society. Where this is well harnessed it creates infinite possibilities for citizens to develop, nurture and utilize their full potentials; where it is abused it places limitless constraints on people's abilities and creative responses to situations.

Kant (1993:30) tells that there is 'only one categorical imperative and it is this: Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law'. In such a condition the distinction between action and word ought not to exist. African leaders as pacesetters must aim to capture this fusion. Yet there is a common notion associated with politics as inherently amoral. This is not just the view of the sideliners but chiefly that of the participants. Ekeh (1983: 22-23) quotes a prominent Nigerian politician who was challenged about the 'morality' in his style of politics which induced the destruction and burning of houses of political opponents outside his own ethnic group but within his domain of political control in pre-civil war Nigeria as retorting that 'politics is not church'. The Minister of Culture, chief Nanga, in Achebe's *A Man of the people* (1966:119) in an attempt to dissuade the political upstart Odili from contesting his position offers him money and scholarship and advises him to 'leave the dirty game of politics to us who know how to play it'.

Machiavelli in *The Prince* advised rulers not to keep faith when by so doing it would be against their interest. As a matter of fact 'political discussions that underscore a concern with ideals, moral dimensions, or ethical principles and goals often have an air of unreality about them' because 'many of us consider politics to involve skilled manipulation of power, bargaining between interests, and willingness to live with necessary evils' (Abbate 1977:3). The point really is that all too often we become what we believe.

Yet enduring societal transformation can only be achieved through citizens who are properly inspired and guided by exemplary leaders. In the final analysis, citizens are a country's best asset. A country can only go as far as the collective will of its people can push it. The same claim can safely be made for a continent.

#### **Africa and superpower politics**

Resolving African leadership crisis in an era of global politics requires team spirit – a shared commitment to protect and preserve the interests (political, economic, and ideological, among others) of the continent. This collective concept is, however, difficult to cultivate among African leaders. At least, three key reasons can be identified as responsible.

First is discordant solidarity. The methods of power ascension in most African states frustrate any effort at building a united force. For instance in the 2008 election crisis in Zimbabwe support for Mugabe was divided, mostly, according to how the African leader got into power or is maintaining power. Prime Minister Odinga of Kenya, given his ordeal in the hands of President Kibaki, was very vocal in his condemnation of Mugabe's election conduct and his support for the opposition leader Tsvangari. Late Omar Bongo, Gabon's president for Life was tacitly on the side of Mugabe. The criticism of late Nigeria president, Yar'Adua, of Mugabe's action lacked weight. It was condemned by most political analysts, especially members of Nigeria's main opposition party, Action Congress, as hypocritical. The view was that Yar'Adua got into office through rigging and as such had no moral grounds to pass judgment on his *unethical equal*. With such composition the AU, and even the SADC were, for a long time, unable to take a firm stand on the issue. During Libya's crisis, Nigeria and South Africa did not support the AU peace plan for Libya. Instead they voted for the UN Security Council's no-fly zone over Libya.

However, Jean Ping, the ex-chairperson of the AU Commission in an interview with Yaiche and Onattara (2012:30) states that 'through its work, the AU is looking to create a united states of Africa'. This cannot happen if African countries fail to present a united front. The fragility of most African states opens them up and make them easy target for international interference. In an era of weak sovereignty, international community of concepts such as 'responsibility to protect' and 'humanitarian intervention' can be manipulated.

The second is external linkages and leakages. The retreat of Europe from the colonial world was not an 'enlightened gesture' (Austin 1980; Okigbo 1991; Ake 2001). Before retreating from Africa, the colonial administrator put some security and safety measure in place. They ensured that their successors are pliable and that the economy of their ex-colony remained tied to their interest. The late Bongo, France's handpicked successor, reputed to be one of the richest men in the world, owned many homes in France and many bank accounts. France in return enjoyed several favourable oil and other business concessions in Gabon all through his long rule. Gabonese accused France of helping Ali Bongo to rig the presidential election of August 30, 2009 in order to succeed his late father. France's interest was seen as trying to ensure that the next leader could be trusted to be attentive to their values and needs. To appreciate this better let us ask: the authoritarian thrust that emerged with independence who has benefited most from this arrangement? Nzongola-Ntalaja (80) informs us that 'African economies are still tied to the economies of the former colonial powers, which continue to exploit the continent's resources through bilateral relations'. Most often the flight of capital from Africa ends up in financial institutions of the developed Western countries. Nuhu Ribadu, Nigeria's former Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) boss, told the BBC network Africa programme in 2006 that 'more than \$380bn has either been stolen or wasted by Nigerian governments since independence in 1960' and that 'probably part of it will have gone to outside stealing'. Nutt (2005) observes that in Kenya while many organizations were fighting deep-seated corruption under the rotten presidency of Daniel arap Moi, Moi was transferring government money out of the country to UK bank accounts. Nutt insists that 'the very genesis of African corruption is also something that the rich G8 nations must take a good deal of responsibility for'. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, the former and current finance Minister of Nigeria, while

speaking at the second annual Sabot Memorial Lecture organised by the Center for Global Development in 2007 also accused rich countries of aiding and abetting corruption that 'hurts poor people and costs developing countries billions of dollars.' She observed that in Nigeria 'from 1993 to 1998 the Sani Abacha regime looted and sent abroad an estimated \$3 billion to \$5 billion, much of it to Swiss banks.' *Punch* newspaper of April 25, 2014 (2) reports that the Nigerian Federal government is currently reaching out to the World Bank to assist it in the repatriation of 185 million Euro (about \$250m) Abacha loot confiscated in 2012 by the State of Liechtenstein.

The third is the highhandedness of the west in thinking and acting as if they know what is best for Africa's political health. The conviction of Charles Taylor is seen by most political analyst as engineered by superpower politics (Davies 2012, Boateng 2012, Waugh 2012 and Mahony 2012). Taylor (2012) in his defence remarked that George Bush promised to 'bring Nigeria to its knees' if Nigeria did not turn him over to the special court. Taylor went further to observe that:

*'This [Bush's threat] demonstrates the significant pressure that was brought to bear on president Obasanjo, irrespective of his personal and leadership obligations to the west African sub-region. And therein lies the dilemma for current African heads of state and governments – how to enter into binding commitments and obligations with their African peers and remain steadfast, resolute and unyielding in their fidelity to those agreements in the face of such unrelenting and punishing pressure from powerful western leaders (25).'*

This attitude is also demonstrated in Jean Chretien's letter to Thabo Mbeki. Ankomah (2012:64) reports that on 1 November 2003, the then prime minister of Canada, Jean Chretien wrote to the then South African president and chairperson of the AU, Thabo Mbeki, asking that the continent supplant the then nascent AU with Nepad. The thinking behind this action was to thwart the 'hope in Nepad's ability to move Africa forward'. Ankomah notes that the 'thought to two strong continental institutions (the African Union and Nepad) working together struck

real fear into the hearts of the powerbrokers of the world'. Fortunately Mbeki rather than capitulating pointed out to Chretien in a reply which was widely circulated to the G8, EU, the UN secretary general, the Nordic countries, members of the Nepad Implementation Committee, and heads of multilateral organizations that Africans have the capacity to determine what is in their best interest.

Laudable as this may be, Ankomah reminds us that 'Nepad's weakest point is that it was a socio-economic programme designed for Africans by Africans who expected the bulk of the funding to come from "external partners", particularly in the west. And when the "partners" did not get their way in supplanting the AU with Nepad, they refused, as Chretien had warned' (66). Add this to the fact that the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa was a donation from China. How does this impact on the relationship between China and Africa? In a case of serious conflict of interest who will blink first? In relation to the AU headquarters Ankomah also raised some relevant questions: 'Can Africa maintain it? Or are the Chinese going to stay forever and thus take the maintenance problem off Africa's head?' (66). This prompts a reminder of unintended consequences. In an age of advanced technology does it not pose a significant risk to hand over such sensitive project to an outsider to execute and possibly maintain? How does it affect security of AU affairs? For Mbeki's reply to *truly* drive home the message there is need to get the AU to the status where it can provide a counterweight to the EU. It is left for African leaders to understand how fundamental this is and how fundamental they also need to make it their own guiding principle. Although the word subservient in a post-colonial era will not be admitted, Africa needs to be conscious and cautious of the fact that white powerbrokers demand it, albeit covertly, from their African counterparts as a way of granting them benefits. The first interest of Europe will always be the interest of Europeans. The first interest of Africa should always be Africans first.

### Conclusion

The point of this paper is that any practical measure that will lead to sustainable politics in Africa and any theoretical reflection that would support it, must involve a philosophical analysis of the constraints and possibilities affecting politics in Africa. Politics pose key challenge to development in Africa. The leaders' inability to establish and address the clear links between their political action and all other state

issues is at the core of political crisis in Africa. In cases where such crises degenerate into mini or outright wars, lives are unsettled in a way that frustrates all future possibilities. Césaire (1994:178) accused the coloniser of wiping out extraordinary '*possibilities*'. How does one account for the many possibilities destroyed in infernal power tussle in Africa? At a point like this it is difficult to find a clear distinction between the 1950's (when African countries started gaining their independence) to date and from the era of colonialism to the 1950's. The African leadership prize for good governance has only been awarded three times since its inception in 2007. One clear message it sends out is that sustainable politics in Africa cannot be achieved without excellent leaders.

Achievement of excellence, however, requires that African leaders will have to transcend constraints and translate possibilities into actualities, simultaneously. Only then will the distinction between politics and other sectors be seen as a continuum, more a result of socio-political re-engineering, alliances, deals and strategies that come together to form a strong, united force than a post-colonial construct.

### Notes

- (1) I am treating Africa here in an undifferentiated manner. It is, however, important to note that a country like Ethiopia has all the attributes of a modern African state without sharing colonialism.
- (2) A fruitful enterprise is one located in a context of additional enterprises, which should be a fertile site for discovery of new enterprises.
- (3) The BRACED Commission is a grouping of Nigeria's six Niger Delta States: Bayelsa, Rivers, Akwa Ibom, Cross River, Edo and Delta.
- (4) I am using political socialization in the sense defined by Schaefer and Lamm (1997:312) to mean the process by which individuals acquire political attitudes and develop patterns of political behaviour.

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